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ABSTRACT 
Peacekeeping operations often involve more than one actor. With regard to an intrastate war, 
a peaceful resolution of a conflict often involves external actors. For the purpose of this study 
the actors have been divided into three groups: local, regional and global, and four variables 
were identified to determine what influences a decision of each actor to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission. The study therefore seeks to understand the relationship and interplay 
between the various actors within the peace process. Recent studies have focused on different 
international organisations peacekeeping efforts, yet the transformations of one actor to 
another are not well understood. In this study two civil wars are explored and four hypotheses 
are identified to explain the transformations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
SECTION ONE: Aim, Rationale and Methodology 
1.1 Research Title: 
The multiple transformations of peacekeeping and its actors: A comparative analysis of 
Burundi and Somalia 
1.2 Aim and Rationale 
There has been an increase of peacekeeping missions on the African continent since the end 
of the Cold War. Of the 29 peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations (UN) 
and resource cost of US$ 7.3 billion, more than half are currently taking place in Africa
1
. 
There have been over 45 peacekeeping missions on the continent and African troops have 
been involved in most of them. 
It could be argued that the efforts of keeping peace is expensive and that it needs to have 
clear mandates of what it would entail and who will be involved. However, it should be noted 
that theUN's role is not limited to  peacekeeping and that there are multiple actors with 
different roles and motives involved in the peace process. 
Each actor in the peacekeeping missions are driven by their own values and particular peace 
doctrines, while still being part of a broader effort to bring peace to an armed conflict state 
involving a multiplicity of other actors and peace operations.  
However, the term 'peacekeeping' implies that there is an organised body that is readily 
available in times of conflict that will intervene to keep the peace. But this is not the case. 
Peacekeeping missions follow a process that requires involvement from multiple actors that 
at times do not have the same objective in mind or deals with logistical and ideological 
consternation. Contemporary peacekeeping not only involves keeping the peace but also 
peace-enforcement and peace-building, which for the purpose of this study will be 
incorporated in the term 'peacekeeping'.  
                                                          
1 UN. 2013. UN peacekeeping fact sheet: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml 
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Therefore, the problem lies in what exactly is the purpose of the mission? If it is required to 
monitor a peace-agreement, logistical support would be small, but if it has to enforce the 
peace, military personnel and equipment is needed which would require greater numbers and 
a support from a larger organisational body.  
Moreover, as the mandate changes so does the involvement of an actor. The current literature 
on peacekeeping focuses on the success or failure of peacekeeping missions. It does not focus 
on what makes a peacekeeping mission transform from one actor to another to involve greater 
involvement with other organisations.  
It is clear from various peacekeeping missions that there are stages of development, from the 
involvement of a single state, to regional organisation to a global or international institution. 
This transformation is considered the rule and not the exception and yet research has not been 
conducted on what conditions inform the rule.  
This research report will investigate what conditions are needed or inform the transformation 
of actors in peacekeeping. It stands to reason that the more actors involved in peacekeeping 
the more complex the relationship is between them. If the relationship is complex does it 
allow for cooperation or a disjointed partnership? If the various actors involved do not 
cooperate it could have implications for foreign policy development and the success of the 
peacekeeping mission. 
The transformation process is important for actors not only because of policy considerations 
but also because of the possible implications if said actors do not cooperate. It is important to 
understand the problems that can occur if there is no smooth transformation. For example, 
what are the implications to the peace process if there is no take-over from the UN to enable 
an international transformation? The UN has over 60 years of experience in peacekeeping 
whereas the AU only has 10 years. There are no guidelines or template that indicates how 
such a change will occur yet it happens on a regular basis.     
The focus of this dissertation is to explain what circumstances led to South Africa’s 
engagement in Burundi. What conditions led to the transition from South Africa to the 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)? How did AMIB give way to the UN? The 
circumstances in Somalia were similar and this dissertation will look at this case as well.. For 
example, what circumstances led to Uganda’s engagement in Somalia? When and how did 
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the IGAD mission of Somalia (IGASOM) emerge as a peacekeeping actor? What led to the 
demise of IGASOM and the emergence AMISOM?  
The process of transformation is an under-researched field within peacekeeping. Authors of 
various peacekeeping missions concentrate on either one or two of the actors but not on what 
causes a transformation. The purpose of this paper is to understand the conditions that inform 
the changes within a mission. This paper investigates the relationship between the two case 
studies presented in this paper .It must be noted that the findings are relevant for the two case 
studies presented in this paper and not other peacekeeping missions that are taking place in 
Africa or across the world. My findings are limited because only two case studies have been 
conducted and a broader spectrum of research is needed.  
1.3 Research question: 
Peacekeeping has multiple transformations from unilateral state intervention to regional and 
globalised peacekeeping. These steps of transformation have to be explained and analysed.  
For example, variables causing the change needs to be identified, whether it’s the mandate or 
the actors’ constellation. It is important to understand  how quickly a unilateral intervention 
becomes a multilateral mission. It is also imperitive to understand what the actors are doing. 
Because the phenomena is complex, this dissertation has one overarching research question 
with three sub-questions 
Research question: What conditions explain the multiple transformations of the actors 
involved in peacekeeping?  
Sub-questions:  
What actor constellation is found in the mission? This is important because it investigates 
who the drivers of the mission are; and what is the politics behind the peacekeeping. 
How are the mandates changing? The question relates to what is done on the ground. 
How is the conflict impacting the actors’ capabilities? If the conflict is more severe, than 
greater capacity would be needed and would have an impact on what the actors do. 
1.4  Methodology 
The study uses qualitative research and makes use of four independent variables that explain 
peace missions. It is inductive research that will explain the evolution of various actors’ 
 4 
 
involvement in missions. It makes use of process-tracing method (George and Bennett, 2005: 
207) to understand the empirical data that will be researched. Through the process-tracing 
method, the empirical information will allow the researcher to give evidence on potential 
processes and hypotheses, as it will allow for step-by-step trajectories of change and 
causation. Each step is described and the sequence of events analysed to better explain the 
evolution. It traces the process that causes causality, looking at the historical events and 
finding the link. This research is explorative and will look at what is the real impact of the 
different transformation. It will not assume deterministic causality, and not test theories 
against each other. As mentioned above the findings are based on the two case studies and the 
conclusions drawn from them inform the hypothesis. The paper is not theory testing but 
rather an investigation of the empirical data obtained through desktop research. 
Operationaliastion  
The research identified four potential conditions (independent variables) that have a crucial 
effect on peacekeeping. It is inductive and is therefore open to finding and exploring  these 
conditions that are guiding the transitions. 
Independent Variables 
Doctrines or preferences of actors: This variable will look at the foreign policy interests of 
the unilateral states and the peace doctrines of regional and international organisations.  In 
other words,  what exactly the AU and UN say regarding peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report 
(2000) of the UN and the AU Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force 
and the Military Staff Committee (2003) define these organisations peacekeeping doctrines. 
The report specifies the impact of the transition and whether it is  compatible with the 
doctrines and preferences of the actors and if these interest mesh.  The ideas of individual 
state actor are also a determinant for a peacekeeping operation. The ideas of both institutions 
and states, both when they are right or wrong are very powerful. The ideas of actors are 
perceived as road map that influences the outcomes. Or ideas can help actors adopt a specific 
tactic or persuasion. It should be noted that this variable is based on the different policies that 
make up the doctrines of various actors. The actors do not apply the doctrines coherently but 
for this study is a useful tool as a starting step for a peacekeeping mission.   
Changing nature of the conflict: Conflict has degrees of escalation that requires different 
actor involvement. A cease-fire monitoring mission would require only single state 
 5 
 
involvement. However, if there is a greater need for security the peacekeeping mission will 
have to transform. If the conflict is not ending, a peacekeeping mission from a global actor is 
less likely to occur. In Burundi they were required to make certain reforms and then the 
mission concluded successfully. In Somalia the conflict is ongoing. The time that actors take 
to complete their mandate would be important to explain the transformation. 
Interest: Power considerations largely determine the interest calculation of political elites and 
therefore foreign policy and interaction. What is important is the interest of the states and 
institutions will guide the architect of the peace process. State behaviour is driven by a quest 
to increase or preserve relative power. Powerful actors impact on the bargaining dynamics 
through their ability to create best alternatives. Interest predetermine possible actions and 
outcomes of the peace process 
Institutions: Institutions aggregate the interest of the multiple actors involved in the peace 
process. Institutions are conceptualised as platforms that allow cooperation to occur and 
make peacekeeping operations possible and credible. They also affect the distribution of cost 
and benefits of state interaction. Institutions have distributional consequences, which can be 
used as devices to seek and maintain asymmetrical gains. They can also be used as a 
mechanism to control combatant’s behaviour.   
 Dependent Variable:  
The phenomena have three outcomes but the unilateral state intervention is always part of the 
transformation of the mission. Peacekeeping can come in different forms and these forms are: 
Unilateral state intervention:  This relates to single state intervention, usually to ensure that a 
cease-fire agreement is adhered to.  South Africa entered Burundi after there was a peace 
agreement in place.  In Somalia, Uganda was the first country to enter the conflict and 
thereafter, Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Regional transformation: This study will focus on the role of the AU. However, it should be 
noted that other regional actors such as ECOWAS and SADC also had peacekeeping roles in 
Liberia and Congo. Others, like ECOMOG interventions, clearly demonstrated their logistical 
weakness especially in peacekeeping; it still had peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, 
Guinea-Bissau. ECCAS has to function in the contentious Great Lakes region and IGAD that 
started as a body that was supposed to focus on drought also has a security structure. The 
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Arab Maghreb also has a security dimension. The different regional economic communities 
are the support structure of the AU during its peacekeeping missions. 
Global transformation: This is the UN’s involvement in the peacekeeping mission. The UN 
has a different mandate for each mission and that will be explored. 
Data collection 
Primary sources would be UN resolutions and Peace and Security documents from the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. The information focuses on 
the UN Offices in Burundi (BNUB) and the instrumental role it played in ending the 13 years 
of  civil conflict and the successful elections in 2010. 
In Somalia, the UN does not have a mission but is currently in the country to assist the 
transition government and the political office (UNPOS). The importance of the sites is the 
amount of information about past interventions (intervening variable) and what is currently 
happening to support the transition.   
The AU’s Standby Force published documents that would also provide primary data. Other 
sources include interviews that are available on the internet as well as the 1996 South African 
White Paper on National Defence and other policies that informed a certain decision. 
Speeches and statements by high-level officials and heads of government will also contribute 
to the study.  
The study will also make use of books, journals and newspaper articles. 
1.5 Case Selection 
The two selected cases  are used to show a variance on situations and outcomes. The Burundi 
case had a UN peacekeeping mission while Somalia does not have UN intervention, another 
reason for the case selcetion is to avoid selection bias. The case studies have been  
chosenbecause they provide for an empirical investigation for a comparative inquiry. Both 
are African countries that were involved in a civil war. The Burundi conflict started in 1993 
and has had a full transformation, meaning that it has a global actor involved in 
peacekeeping. One of the severe conflicts in Africa with over a quarter of a million people 
killed, this ethnic conflict started during its first election 30 years after the country gained 
independence. The conflict had serious consequences for not just the country in terms of a 
humanitarian crisis and genocide, but also because the region  could be seen as the precursor 
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for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Great Lakes region during the time had a number of 
other civil wars that led to an influx of refugees into Burundi and further destabilised it. 
Discussion was held in 2000 for a cease-fire but little was achieved. South Africa entered the 
country after other states refused to monitor the cease-fire agreement. The AU sent a force of 
just over 2500 men in 2003 to create the conditions for a UN peacekeeping force to take over. 
In 2004 the UN mission (ONUB) was deployed (Resolution 1545) in order to restore lasting 
peace.  Within this case, the two variables that were  deterministic in the outcome are the 
severity of the conflict and the capacity that is needed to complete the missions. The UN 
deployed military personnel of 5650, 200 observers; 125 staff officers; up to 120 civilian 
police and appropriate civilian personnel. 
The conflict in Somalia started in 1991 and only had a regional transformation. Peacekeeping 
in this country had the near impossible task of not only creating a new state but also stop 
warring factions. The AU has a slow expansion and footprint in terms of peace and security. 
The focus currently in Somalia is on stopping the expansion of Al-Shabaab links in the 
country. The severity of the conflict at its height was the drought of 1992 leading to a famine 
that killed between 300 000 and 500 000 people. An analysis of the severity of the conflict 
should be aware of the drought aspect. The country suffers from a food security crisis that 
continued military operations have exacerbated.  What is interesting with this case study is 
that the current lack of peacekeeping missions despite the ongoing conflict. Somalia had a 
previous UN intervention mission and that could explain why there is no global actor 
currently involved in keeping the peace. Operation Restore Hope, launched in 1992 under 
UN resolution 704, resulted in a contradictory multi-mandated intervention, with an annual 
expenditure of US$1.5 billion, the most expensive humanitarian operation ever undertaken. 
However, it still did not bring about conditions of peace. The AMISOM has also changed 
over the years in numbers and mandate.  
Burundi and Somalia are interesting because they have some commonalities and differences 
that are useful for a comparative analysis. The two cases are also big interventions with 
different mandates. These two cases also represent what conditions inform a transformation. 
1.6  Identification of the knowledge gap and value added to the literature 
There is a vast range of peacekeeping literature in Africa and this study will add value to the 
different literature by investigating the transforming role of actors and how they interact with 
each other. It will also highlight the complexity through which different actors get involved 
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(their mandate) in peacekeeping and what they actually do in the mission. The study would 
also be useful to see if the interventions were peace-enforcement or if the external actors only 
hid under the rubric of peacekeeping. 
1.7 Theoretical foundation 
Peacekeeping theories 
There is no clear theory on peacekeeping but numerous researchers have tried to define it and 
what it entails. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010: 13) define traditional peacekeeping as 
creating conditions  for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. However, 
contemporary peacekeeping has moved away from the protection of the sovereignty of the 
state towards sovereignty with responsibility. According to Jeong (2005:2) not all peace 
processes are the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations, 
including the intensity and level of violence in intergroup relations and their impact on 
transformative dynamics. Even with a negotiated settlement, shooting, bombing, shelling and 
other types of violence do not necessarily stop immediately. Where there is violence or threat 
of violence, physical safety is an important concern.  Peacekeeping missions are seen as a 
vehicle to help a country after the conflict to make the transition to sustainable peace. 
The UN’s peacekeeping doctrine is focused on intervention in civil wars and/ or interstate 
wars or to prevent hostilities between possible belligerents from increasing, so that by acting 
as a buffer  a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached. Peacekeeping is based on 
the principles of consent, impartiality, and the absence of force except for self-defence and 
defence of the mandate. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is responsible for the 
international peace and security enshrined in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter. 
 
The UN Agenda on Peace (1992) states that the first attempt would have to identify at the 
earliest stage situations that could produce conflict and to try diplomacy to remove this 
danger. If conflict has already erupted, the aim of peacekeeping would be aimed at resolving 
the issue that has led to the conflict. Peace should be preserved after the conflict no matter 
how fragile. 
 
Governments and international organisations have been prone to label many different kinds 
of military action as peacekeeping in order to legitimise their actions. The terms 
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'peacekeeping' and 'peace operations' are not found in the UN charter, but are informed by the 
author’s experience, interest and values (Bellamy et al, 2010: 14).  
Moreover, there are number of peace strategies that are utilised by actors:  
1. Peacekeeping: Effects by third parties such as the United Nations (UN) to intervene in 
civil wars and/ or interstate wars or to prevent hostilities between possible belligerents 
from increasing, so that by acting as a buffer a negotiated settlement of the dispute 
can be reached.  
2. Preventive diplomacy: Diplomatic performance taken in advance of a predictable 
crisis to prevent or limit violence. 
3. Peace making: the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other forms of 
peaceful resolution that arranges an end to a disagreement and determines the issues 
that led to conflict. 
4. Peace building: Post conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic that 
fortify and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to circumvent 
recourse to armed conflict.  
5. Peace operations: A general category encompassing both peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement operations undertaken to establish and maintain peace between 
disputants. 
6. Peace enforcement: Use of military or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to 
international authorisation, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions 
designed to maintain or restore peace and order (Kegley and Wittkopf: 2004: 589). 
AU members were concerned about the continued prevalence of armed conflict in Africa and 
the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to the socio-economic decline on 
the continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within 
and between African states. The conflicts have forced millions of people into becoming 
drifting refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihoods, 
human dignity and hope. The impact of the illicit proliferation circulation and trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa are undermining 
efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples (AU, 2008). The AU pretexts three 
legal exceptions that allow it to intervene in domestic disputes: 
 Genocide 
 Gross violations of human rights 
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 Instability in a country that threatens regional stability; and unconstitutional changes 
of government 
The AU’s peacekeeping doctrine as stated by the Solemn Declaration on a Common African 
Security and Defence Policy Article 3 (f) notes that the Union shall promote peace, security 
and stability on the continent.  
Boutellis and Williams (2013: 5) state that the UN-AU collaboration confronts four major 
challenges: the two organisations do not have a cooperative frameworks; what the AU wants 
to achieve in terms of peacekeeping; UN’s relationship with the African regional economic 
communities; and the lastly the divergent views on peace operations evident at the UN and 
AU.   
International Organisations Interplay 
It is important to understand how different organisations interact. In the case of the AU it 
would create the conditions for peace and security reform, but it would be a difficult task 
because it does not have the capacity. According to Brosig (2010: 330) two basic 
assumptions exist as to explain why organisations cooperate. Firstly, when institutions can 
realise a certain benefit from interacting cooperation is most likely to appear. Secondly, 
decision-making is based on individual actor’s preferences. Post-conflict and fragile 
situations create a legitimacy pull for organisations to set-up a peacekeeping mission and that 
motivates other organisations to get involved. Cooperation among the international 
organisations creates a perception of a legitimate mission. However, Shraga (2011: 351) 
views UN interaction with other third parties as disregarding international law principles - 
that responsibility for the conduct of military operation lies where operational command and 
control is vested. The realities of peacekeeping operations are complex and the perception 
that the UN has exclusive operational command and control is often deceptive, because the 
UN is keen to maintain the integrity of its operations in relation to third parties.   
1.8 Literature overview 
The most authoritative book relating to peacekeeping is Bellamy, Williams and Griffin’s 
Understanding Peacekeeping (2004). The book provides theory, practice and politics of 
modern peacekeeping. It examines the changing environment that peacekeeping operates in 
and the role of peacekeeping in the wider process that includes non-state actors. Challenges 
of peacekeeping are also examined. The book is helpful in understanding the dynamics of 
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conflict, security and the actors involved in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is distinguished 
from military intervention by the fact that peacekeeping forces usually arrive in a country 
only after a ceasefire has been agreed to between the warring parties and with permission of 
the host country. The functions of UN peacekeeping operations have expanded in three 
directions: peacemaking, peace-building and peace-enforcement.  
Much has been written about UN peacekeeping. For example, Sitkowski’s United Nations 
Peacekeeping (2006), investigates the idea of whether or not peacekeeping is a distinct form 
of peace-enforcement. The author also investigated the application of force only for self-
defence purposes and lack of authorisation of the use of UN Security Council mandates.  
There are numerous published works on the evolution of UN peacekeeping, especially since 
the end of the Cold War. An example of this is Thadar and Schabel’s United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagements. The book focuses on 
the thinking, experiences and frustrations in the field. It also brings into focus the regional 
experiences of peacekeeping missions.    
The failures of peacekeeping missions have also been well documented. Shawcross’s, Deliver 
Us from Evil (2002)critically examines the UN missions after the Cold War with a specific 
emphasis on two peacekeeping missions. The two missions, Rwanda and Bosnia had serious 
flaws and resulted in great loss of life. 
There have also been numerous works on conflict in Africa and peacekeeping where the role 
of regional actors have been analysed. Adebajo’s UN Peacekeeping in Africa: from Suez 
Crisis to the Sudan Conflict’s (2011) examines the process of peacekeeping on the continent. 
More than half of the UN missions have been in Africa and the author investigates the 
resurgence of UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa and their success and failure. African 
regional security is investigated as well. 
Khadiagala and Lyon’s Conflict Management and African Politics: Ripeness, Bargaining, and 
Mediation (2008), focus on regional peacekeeping from different regional economic 
communities in Africa. The book investigates the capacity coordination of the members 
participating in international and regional peacekeeping.  
Victor’s African peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics’ and State 
Legitimacy (2010) notes that African leaders, since the end of the Cold War have made the 
most determined strides in coming together to remedy regional ills. The most visible manner 
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of cooperation has been in the form of international peacekeeping. African peacekeepers less 
often come from the most developed states such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, but 
more often from poorer countries including Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda. 
Victor further argues that peacekeeping contributions form African states mostly come from 
the most politically repressive regime in Africa, because it plays a diversionary role from 
internal problems. Furthermore, a major incentive for developing countries to participate is 
that they receive a monthly stipend per soldier, which is paid to the government. When large 
contingents of African peacekeepers are preparing to deploy, major powers often step in to 
provide sufficient equipment and training 
Stock’s Policy Analysis: A mandate is not enough: the Security Council and Peacekeeping 
(2011) highlights that a peace operation needs a peace process to have an achievable goal. 
Currently peace operations do not only involve ending the conflict between parties but also 
the protection of civilians; the restoration and/or extension of the authority of the host state, 
disarmament, and re-integration of combatants, de-mining and other tasks which extend 
partly into the area of peacebuilding. The Stock article  (2011:13) underscores the four issues 
that must be dealt with in order to adept peacekeeping to contemporary challenge: peace 
operations have to be deployed more rapidly; the decision between only mandating or 
mandating and commanding a peace operation by the UN-SC is of critical importance; 
imbalance continues in the division of labour between different stakeholders in UN 
peacekeeping; and peacekeeping partnerships with single TCCs and particularly the regional 
organisations have a lot of potential.     
1.9 Chapterisation of the study 
Section 1: Research and methodology 
This chapter will provide the introduction and scope of the study. It also provides definitions 
of the most important concepts, the analytical framework and the literature overview of this 
study. 
Section 2:  Background of Burundi conflict 
This chapter will provide a background to the Burundian conflict. It is important to 
understand the possible causes for the conflict and to understand peace agreement that was 
put in place that allowed for a peacekeeping mission. The focus is on when the civil war 
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started and possible reasons for the conflict. It will discuss South Africa’s role and what made 
the country intervene in the peace process. 
Section 3: The AU and UN in Burundi 
The focus of this chapter would be on the evolution of the actors from South Africa to the AU 
and then the UN. The research will focus on the mandates of the two organisations and what 
they achieved in Burundi. It will focus on what conditions were needed for the transformation 
of actors. The focus will also be on the interplay between these two institutions to ensure a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
Section 4: Background of the Somalia conflict 
This chapter will focus on the reasons for the conflict in Somalia as well as previous 
interventions in the country. The focus will be on the role of IGAD as the local actor and 
what conditions were needed for IGAD to get involved in the conflict. An important aspect of 
this conflict is that it changed dramatically throughout its course.  
Section 5: AMISOM and the UN 
IGAD’s relationship with AMISOM is briefly discussed in this section. The mandate of 
AMISOM will be researched to establish whether it is peacekeeping or peace-enforcement. It 
will also focus on why the UN does not employ a peacekeeping mission, and what role the 
UN is willing to play in the post-conflict reconstruction.  
Section 6: Conclusion and Main findings 
The final chapter will have a summary of the main findings and if causality exists. It will 
provide a comparison between the two missions and what are the experiences in the 
contemporary forms of peacekeeping. 
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SECTION TWO: Burundi’s conflict and South African Intervention 
2. 1 Introduction 
Burundi is the first case that this dissertation will examine on the investigation of what 
conditions affect the transformation of peacekeeping. This section looks at the conflict of the 
country and the role that South Africa played in bringing peace to the country. The actor 
constellation is investigated and what motivates an actor to become involved in a peace 
operation.   
Burundi is a very small country, approximately 27 830 km. It is surrounded by very large 
nations, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Tanzania. The country is 
rich in resources such as nickel, uranium, cobalt and platinum. However, this small country 
has a very large population, over 8.7 million people living in that small space. 
The population composition of the Burundi people is 14 percent Tutsi, 85 percent Hutu and 
one percent Twa (pygmy). Before colonisation the Tutsi and Hutu people lived peacefully 
with one another for centuries although the Tutsi were for a long period politically and 
economically dominant (Bentley and Southall, 2005:31). 
Before the 1993 conflict, Burundi was one of the poorest countries in the world. The majority 
of the people are rurally located and the densely populated country faced acute environmental 
challenges of over-cultivation, overgrazing, soil erosion and deforestation. The fact that the 
peasant population engaged in genocide violence, according to Bentley and Southall 
(2005:23), was prompted by a sense “that there are simply too many people living on the 
land, and that with a reduction in their numbers there would be more space for survivors." 
2.2 Tracing the roots of the conflict 
Burundi was briefly controlled by Germany and thereafter for four decades by Belgium. In 
1958 the Union pour le Progres National (UPRONA) was founded by Prince Louis 
Rwagasore, a son of a disposed king with close links to the Hutu community. To counter this 
movement the Belgian administration helped create the Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC). In 
1961 legislative election, OPRONA gained 58 of the 64 seats and was a multi-ethnic party: 
25 Tutsis, 22 Hutu and 7 Twa and 4 of mixed percentage. In October 1961, PDC agents 
assassinated Rwagasore, and during that same period Rwanda’s social revolution was taking 
place. For the next four years Burundian politics was extremely unstable and gridlocked. The 
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main parties became divided internally; the Hutu-Tutsi division became more apparent. In 
1965 a failed Hutu coup d’état led to swift military retribution with thousands dead. The Tutsi 
military officer in charge of repressing that operation, Major Michel Micambero was offered 
a ministerial position. After a bloodless coup of a few months, he took over the government. 
Thus began a three decade military rule by a small group of Tutsi-Twa from Bururi province: 
Micambero (1966-76) Jean-Baptiste Bogoza (1976-87), and Pierre Buyoya (1987-93). This 
constituted the creation of a low-case Tutsi dictatorship (Uvin, 2009:9). 
Furthermore, Uvin (2009:10) stated that during this time the country developed a system of 
almost total Hutu exclusion. By 1985 only 4 Hutu members were ministers in cabinet out of 
20, 17 Hutu MPs out of 65, and only 2 Hutu members of UPRONA’s central committee out 
of 52. The state became a ‘milking cow’ for the elite that controlled it, which came under 
increasing attack. By late 1988, Hutu mobs organised by the Parti pout la Liberation du 
People Hutu (Palipehutu), a radical movement born in Tanzania refugee camps, were leading 
attacks in Burundi. Due to this pressure, Buyoya set out to introduce a system of reform. 
2.3 The crisis begin  
The unjust and inefficient system came under serious attack. The economy stalled and debts 
mounted. Although the structural adjust programs was partly implemented, it increased 
political and economic competition among elites and aspiring elites. The World Bank 
reported that the country experienced a negative growth rate of 6.2 of its GDP 1993 as well as 
a decline in GFP. The 1993 World Bank Report on the country highlighted that the country 
was ethnically and politically divided. This created conditions for the government to 
intervene in areas such as agriculture. This hampered private entrepreneurs in the production, 
trading and agra-processing arena. This lack of intervention led to management and 
investment inefficiencies in the public sector. The report further noted that government 
lacked the political will, administrative and legal institutions to implement the laws.   
The violence that ensued because of corruption and ethnic divisions led to democratic 
elections. The Constitution Commission labelled it as a ‘national unity’ step. From the onset 
it was clear that ethnic divide would be a threat to a peaceful outcome if the cotes of the 
majority Hutu electorate were to prevail. Two parties UPRONA and FRODEBU dominated 
the election. Despite the fears a disruptive election it was conducted in a peaceful and calm 
atmosphere with small difficulties. Melchior Ndadaye won the elections, but the scale of 
UPRONA’s defeat added severe consequences for Burundi (Bentley and Southall, 205:47). 
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In October 1993, Hutu President Ndadeye was killed when some elements of the Tutsi 
controlled army attacked the Presidential Palace in the centre of Bajumbura. The Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly were killed and for five days there was no 
government. The military coup caused widespread fear among government leaders who fled 
to France (Watt, 2008:47). 
Moreover, Watt (2008:48) noted that once news spread of Ndadeyes death violence erupted 
across the country. The targets were the Tutsi’s and certain pro-Buyoya Hutu’s were killed. 
Estimations of the death toll of the first five days are estimated to be 50 000 Tutsi’s. 
Thereafter the army began its revenge which resulted in 700 000 Hutu fleeing the country, the 
majority to Tanzania.  
The magnitude of the resultant coup led to the massacre of hundreds of people and forced 
thousands of Burundi citizens to take refuge in neighbouring countries. By 1995 there were 
widespread violence, political assisinations and acts of ethnic cleansing in parts of the 
country. Moreover there was the militarisation of the Burundi society that resulted in the 
proliferation of militias (AU, 2013). 
By 1996, the conflict was so precarious in Burundi that the UN viewed it as a possibility for a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Innocent people as well as humanitarian and aid-workers were 
brutally and murdered. A situation of generalised insecurity prevailed in the country in 
defiance of efforts undertaken to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict. By 1998, the 
country also faced a food crisis, and by 2000 there were persistent clashes between the armed 
groups and the socio-economic situation worsened (AU, 2013). 
Moreover, by 2002 the political class was fragmented and tensions were exacerbated by the 
massacre of 173 people in the district of Ituba. In July 2002 there was a resurgence of violent 
attacks and an increase in assassinations targeting local administrators. Organised crime 
worsened as well as armed robbery.  
As Fuhlrott (2007:325) stated,  the conflict had less to do about ethnicity but more to do 
about power. The Tutsi minority had always been in power and this was reinforced through 
colonisation. Due to this, ethnicity was politicised and violence broke out along ethnic lines. 
After the assignation of Ndadeye, the predominantly Tutsi military fought against Hutu rebel 
groups, the largest of these was the Conseil National pour la Defence de la Democratie-
Forces de la Democratie(CNDD-FDD).    
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2.4 The Arusha Peace Accord 
The recurrent state of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability and severe 
exclusion of Burundi was first addressed through the Arusha peace processes. The 
negotiations started in 1995 and facilitated by Julius Nyerere and, after his death, by Nelson 
Mandela on behalf of the States of the Great Lakes region and international community. The 
negotiations took three years to get the parties paryicipate and another two years before the 
Arusha peace Accord was signed. Thereafter, another three years went by before the Global 
Peace Agreement was signed in Pretoria in 2003. However the basis of the peace process is 
the Arusha peace agreement. 
The agreement ultimately looked at the causes of the war and the circumstances that were 
sources for the injustice and frustration among the warring factions. The agreement 
ultimately found that the conflict was political with important ethnic dimensions that 
stemmed from a struggle by the ruling political class to accede to the accord and to remain in 
power.  
Solutions proposed by the agreement had seven key strategies focused specifically on the 
redistribution of the State institutions to integrate and reassure all ethnic groups were 
incorporated into the Burundian society. The agreement specifically called for a new 
constitution to be drawn up that would focus on the rule of law, democracy, good 
governance, pluralism and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, 
unity and solidarity. 
Furthermore, the agreements seek to shed light on the serious acts of violence that were 
committed during the cyclical conflicts that have been present since the country achieved 
independence in 1962. It further noted that the crisis was a profound one and that the  
reconciliation task would be a long and exacting one. The focus was therefore to ensure that 
all Burundian people felt they had a stake in the country, whereby all citizens were awarded 
equal rights and equal protection of the law. The objective of the peace agreement was to 
ensure that all Burundians were entitled to live in security and peace, and most of all in 
harmony with each other. 
The agreement also had a very clear and specific deadline for a cease-fire, which would be 
two days after the signing of the peace agreement. It recognised that the belligerents were 
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government forces, combatants of political parties and movements, and political and ethnic 
militias. It made it clear that propaganda, within and outside the country would cease, as well 
as acts of violence against the civilian population. 
Part of the cessation of hostility included the establishment of a Joint Commission for Peace 
and Security referred to as the Ceasefire Commission that was responsible for peace and 
security function and worked closely with the peacekeeping force. The Commission consisted 
of the transitional government, combatants, UN, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and 
the Regional Peace Initiative of Burundi. 
2.5 South Africa’s interest for entering Burundi                
As noted above, former South African President Nelson Mandela mediated the peace 
agreement. Together with Deputy President of South Africa Jacob Zuma, Mandela entered 
into eight years of negotiations in which he tried to bring the 14 political parties and 
movements to the peace agreement table. The first step in ensuring that hostilities would 
cease was an economic embargo that was put in place, especially because the country was 
landlocked and vulnerable to such pressure (Nijembere, 2009). 
The success of the peace agreement and its implementation became the responsibility of 
South Africa. In August 2001, the South African government sent 700 troops as part of the 
SA Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD), which became part of the AU mission in 
Burundi (discussed in the next section). The mandate of the SAPSD was to protect Burundian 
politicians who were returning from exile to take part in transitional institutions. More troops 
were added to the military presence after the signing of the December 2002 Ceasefire 
Agreement. The SAPSD later also trained the Burundian soldiers. 
As stated in the operation curriculum (DOD, 2003) for Burundi, the SANDF was deployed in 
Burundi in order to restore peace and allow opposition leaders to participate in the 
transitional government, this prompted South Africa to undertake the ambitious mission. 
General Godfrey Ngewenya (DOD, 2003) stated that the decision to deploy troops was not 
taken lightly, but it would have been impossible for South Africa to enjoy its newfound 
democracy with certain states of Southern Africa and the continent at large in a state of 
conflict. The task therefore was to restore and establish peace on the continent. 
Gen Ngwenya stated that (DOD, 2003):  
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The SANDF got involved in the peace operations with the understanding that 
for South Africa to enjoy economic prosperity and all that democracy brings 
there needs to be stability in the continent. Indeed our country cannot survive 
as an island, as South Africa is inextricably linked to the continent’s stability.  
At the end of October 2001, South Africa had sent two battalions to Burundi, while operating 
under the auspices of the AU, South Africa was essentially left to assure sole responsibility 
for the operation. The deployment of SAPSD initially encountered resistance from the 
Burundian army which tried to force President Buyoya to have them stationed outside the 
capital. South Africa refused to move but after a few months, Burundian officers came to 
accept that the South African troops were sticking to their mandate and had no intention of 
interfering with the autonomy of the Burundian army (HSRC, 2013). 
South Africa’s national interest is linked to regional stability. The awareness has contributed 
to the change in attitude in South Africa for greater engagement in African conflict 
resolution. South Africa’s peacekeeping role emerged within a changed landscape in Africa. 
According to Accord (2007:13), the Burundian conflict was ethnically motivated where 
minority groups were categorised as superior and used their colonial masters to dominate and 
rule over the majority, granting them the power to subjugate the greater part of the 
population. The end f the Cold War saw the system of United Sates and Soviet Union backed 
parties dismantle and the emergence of an all out war.  This is the environment in which 
South Africa had to characterise its peacekeeping in Africa. 
The intervention of South Africa in Burundi, through Mandela provided a critical juncture for 
the country. For South Africa, emerging from post-apartheid transition, Burundi presented the 
opportunity to share its own experiences through a large-scale peace process and whose 
success would impact on the stability of the whole region. South Africa’s response to 
Burundi was a humanitarian one while efforts were made to find a political solution, but 
Burundi was important from a moral standpoint and the material interests for South Africa 
(Accord, 2007:17). 
Furthermore, Accord (2007:17) stated that: 
In the quest for its own development and its progression as a fledgling 
democracy South Africa’s achievements would be measured against the 
progress of those same goals for the rest of the continent, and more 
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specifically for war-torn Central Africa. Its interventions were also closely 
linked to South Africa’s support for the New Economic Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was to serve as the vehicle for 
collectively addressing the continents’ lack of development through the 
promotion of political governance, regional integration and economic and 
corporate investment.  
Both President Thabo Mbeki and Mandela’s administration placed a vested interest in 
strengthening South Africa’s role for conflict resolution in Africa. South Africa’s transition 
model was used by Mandela to initiate the peace process. Using the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (Codesa) as his initial point of reference, the peace process included 
rebel groups in the negotiations. 
General Ngwenya (DOD, 2003) also stated that South Africa was the first country to deploy 
military forces in support of the peace process. “We went to Burundi when no other country 
wanted to go there even though there was a prior agreement to deploy us with countries such 
as Senegal and Nigeria.” 
2.6 South Africa’s idea of peacekeeping 
The South African White Paper on the Participation in Peace Missions (DFA, 1999) stated 
that domestic and international expectations hoped that South Africa would play a leading 
role and became an active participant in attempts to resolve various regional and international 
conflicts. The White Paper states: “South Africa must therefore make a careful appraisal of 
the political and strategic environment within which peace missions are to be launched and 
the principles governing South Africa participation in such efforts. A precise understanding is 
required to the type of mandate that governs peace missions.” 
South Africa’s foreign policy is guided by the affirmation that South African humanity is 
guaranteed when they affirm the humanity of others. This policy is similar in international 
relations whereby states are expected to respect all nations, peoples and cultures. The White 
Paper further states that the country’s approach to conflict resolution is strongly informed by 
its own history- which would entail not being a destructive force in Africa. South Africa 
works within a multilateral system to contribute to the professionalism of their personnel that 
participate in peace missions. 
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The White paper further states that South Africa acknowledged its global responsibility, but 
that SA's foreign policy prioritised Africa. As a result the prime focus of South Africa's future 
engagement would be Africa. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa worked with 
international institutions to seek approval for its peace missions. 
Therefore the deployment of the SANDF to protect political leaders marked South Africa’s 
first engagement in the peace operation in Burundi. For South Africa the Burundi experience 
represented a politically motivated and security related engagement of SANDF. Through its 
peace operations in Burundi the SANDF contributed to a foundation for sustainable 
development (DOD, 2001). 
South Africa's involvement in the conflict shaped  and developed its role as  a Troop 
Contributing Country (TCC). It cemented the Country’s foreign policy commitment to the 
principles of multilateralism. Two important aspects  of South Africa’s involvement in 
Burundi can be identified after the Arusha Agreements were signed. Firstly, as mediator, 
Mandela was charged with approaching African leaders for the deployment of troops to 
Burundi, which he initiated at home.  Mandela persuaded Mbeki to deploy troops that no 
other country had the capacity or willingness to send (Accord, 2007: 25). 
Secondly, Mbeki viewed the Burundian peace process as essential to concurrent initiatives to 
mediate peace in the DRC. Peace in Burundi was considered vital to the overall stability of 
the Great Lakes region. The initial deployment of troops to protect political leaders falls 
outside the purest definition of peacekeeping. But, Accord (2007:26) states that the 
deployment of the SAPSD to ensure the secure installation of the transitional government 
leaders in a suspicious political environment was essential to the peacekeeping process. 
 According to Rautenbach and Vey (2010: 11), the intervention in Burundi was a test for 
African Renaissance policy. It was the first time that South Africa set the tone and pace for a 
solution by Africa for an African problem. The then South Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (DFA, 2001) said that South Africa would make the contribution 
to build a new Africa in which there would be enduring peace and security. Because South 
Africa’s leadership was indebted to their neighbours for the end of apartheid in one way or 
another, there was a moral obligation to plough efforts back into the continent.   
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2.7 Interplay between South Africa and AU  
The 8
th
 Arusha Regional Summit tasked Mandela with the role of facilitator in the Burundi 
peace process. This was the prelude to South Africa’s physical intervention. Burundi is 
geographically far removed from South Africa; it therefore could be argued that it did not 
have direct interest in the country. The only interest it had was a strategic one whereby 
Burundi could be an ally on the road to stability for the continent (Rautenbach and Vey, 
2010: 13)    
The first mediator in Burundi peace process, Nyerere died in 1999. Mandela was chosen to 
replace him because of his long-standing relationship with Nyerere. Upon Nyerere death 
there was an urgent need to identify a new facilitator. As stated by Rautenbach and Vey 
(2010: 14): 
There was an urgency to move forward with the process on the international, 
regional and Burundian levels, especially in the light of the fact that the 
process has been going on some time. It was time for change for a new 
approach by a freedom fighter who knew what suffering was about and who 
could identify with the plight of the Burundi people.  
After consultation with the OAU and the UN, the communiqué issued by the 8
th
 Arusha 
Regional Summit (2000) declared that Mandela would be the new facilitator. Judge Marc 
Bonani, informed Mandela of the importance of the peace process on the international and 
regional levels vis-a-vis the delays that had been encountered in the peace process. Although 
he remained chief facilitator, the stress of the Burundi process affected Mandel’s health. His 
physical mobility was affected and Zuma continued the task of seeking a ceasefire agreement 
(Rautenbach and Vey, 2010: 20). 
After the signing of the peace agreement, Zuma started consultations with CNDD-FDD 
delegation. Because different grouping did not want to meet face to face with the Burundian 
government throughout 2001 Zuma held various meetings with rebel groups in Pretoria. By 
May 2002, the CNDD-FDD indicated they had no faith in the South African facilitation and 
requested a new facilitation and suggested Tanzania. Negotiations resumed in August 2002 in 
Der-Es Salaam and progress made towards a peaceful settlement. By 25 August 2002 a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed and by 2002 Zuma succeeded in obtaining a 
ceasefire agreement (Rautenbach and Vey, 2010: 25) 
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By 13 March 2003 through various diplomatic shuffling the African Mission took over from 
South Africa in Burundi. Theoretically major facilitation was shifted from South Africa to the 
AU, even though Zuma remained as the facilitator.  
SAPSD continued to carry out the protection function and formed the basis of the advanced 
deployment of the mission. The deployment of the main bodies of Ethiopia and Mozambique 
contingents, which started on 27 September 2003, was completed by 7 October 2003. Until 
the deployment of mission it was predominantly composed by South African troops (1550) 
with 43 observant members from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia (Boshof and 
Vey, 2006: 22).   
According to Boshoff and Vey (2010: 51) the Ministers of Defence of the three-troop 
contributing countries (South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique) mandated the deployment 
of the mission for an initial period for one year. 
SAPSD military presence in Burundi made it possible for the AU peacekeeping force called 
Africa Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to be deployed in 2003. South Africa, together with 
Ethiopia and Mozambique, contributed a peacekeeping contingent of over 3000 troops. Then 
South African Minister of Defence Mosiuao Lekota said that the contingent of countries has 
been asked to coordinate and to examine what contribution can be made. Lekota (DOD, 
2003) stated: “We are keen to fulfil the commitment...to contribute to this important mission 
who has been progressing very slowly. There is a lot of work that needs to be done yet, we 
see this mission as vital in creating the conditions necessary for our region and continent.”    
2.8 Conclusion 
The Burundi conflict can be viewed as an ethnic conflict but, as suggested by this section,  
the undertones were power motivated and that the political elites used ethnicity as the cause 
to propagate their own power ideals. This problem had to be addressed in the peace process 
and the peace agreement addressed and made provision to redress this. From this section it 
can also be deduced that a country’s involvement in another’s conflict has to be motivated by 
interest and ideas. South Africa, as the first actor in the peacekeeping process in Burundi, was 
motivated by national interest and by shaping their idea of peacekeeping. Another reason for 
the local actor involvement is the interplay between the local actor and the regional 
institution. Currently South Africa’s involvement in Burundi is focused on strengthening 
bilateral relations with a strong emphasis on Burundi’s post-conflict reconstruction and 
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development efforts. The following section will investigate the regional and institutional 
involvement in conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
 
SECTION THREE: AU and UN involvement in the Burundi Conflict 
3.1 Introduction 
This section investigates what conditions are needed for a peacekeeping mission to transform 
the local actor to a regional and international actor. The transformation conditions that are 
investigated are that of the institution and interplay between them. Institutions ideas and 
information are key determinants for their involvement. South Africa requested that the AU  
take over the Burundi mission but as this section shows, the OAU/AU was involved in the 
process but later a decision was taken for the institution to become more than just an observer 
in the conflict. 
3.2 OAU as an Institution in the conflict 
As early as 1994, a few months after the assassination of Ndayeye, the OAU condemned the 
killing as a serious blow to the process of democracy. But because of the institutions golden 
rule, the OAU could not interfere in the affairs of African states. The sovereignty of states 
was very important (Landsberg, 2006: 2) and as a result the OAU did not get actively 
involved. However, the institution’s Secretary-General tried to promote dialogue and to 
mobilise the necessary resources to establish the OAU mission in Burundi (OMIB)    
However, Resolution 1524 paragraph 4 of the OAU reconfigured the OMIB into a military 
component in order to assist the people of Burundi to pursue a process of national 
reconciliation. OMIB’s mandate was extended for a period of three years, but the OAU was 
dependent on the international community to provide  financial and logistical support. 
Despite the presence of OMIB, by early 1995 the OAU was aware of the persistent 
uncertainty that prevailed in Burundi due to the activities of the armed groups and the 
assassination organised by extremist groups. Resolution 1560 noted that the presence of the 
institution was needed in Burundi in order to assist in its efforts to regain peace, national 
reconciliation and to focus on reconstruction. 
But, by 1996, the OAU realised that an unstable political and security situation prevailed in 
the country and that the institution recognised the duration of the crisis was a serious concern 
and hampered restoration of peace and national reconciliation (Resolution 1619, paragraph 2: 
1996). By mid-June 1996 the OAU realised that the precarious situation in Burundi was a 
humanitarian catastrophe. It became evident that despite OMIB presence, the mediators 
Presidents Nyerere and Jimmy Carter were unable to help the situation. The rebels and 
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political leaders mediated in an unstable, tense and politically polarised situation and 
insecurity prevailed in Burundi. OMIB not only had to contend with warring factions but 
innocent people and humanitarian aid-workers were brutally murdered (Resolution 1629, 
1996). 
By 1998 developments made by the Burundi people, particularly with regard to national 
debate regarding a partnership for peace, but the situation reached such seriousness that the 
international community was considering calling for sanctions. However, the OAU wanted 
leaders of the Great Lakes region to reconsider the call for sanctions 
3.3 AU’s idea of the peace process in Burundi 
During 2000 to 2002 the OAU was being transformed from the OAU to the AU. The AU had 
a more definitive role to play when it came to peacekeeping and setting an agenda for 
restoring peace to disruptive states. The old non-interference policy that had crippled the 
OAU also made it powerless in the field of preventing violent conflicts (Mwanasali, 2008: 
41). 
With political ideology largely achieved, the AU started prioritising economic development. 
Whereas the OAU rejected interference in the domestic affairs of states, the AU sanctioned 
intervention through the doctrine of non-interference to non-indifference. This was explained 
in Section one of the dissertation. 
The process of restructuring Africa’s governance architecture (2000-2001) occurred when 
four leading African states-South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria- and their continental 
partners undertook eight new policy directives such as: African Renaissance. These policy 
initiatives propose a major restructuring of Africa’s development, governance and peace and 
security ethos (Landsberg, 2006:4). 
This transition came about because apartheid and the Cold War ended. This created a space 
for the African Renaissance discourse to take place.  The end of the Cold War pulled down 
the proxy cover for leadership and administrative inadequacies in and around Africa. The 
continent had remained volatile and vulnerable to external factors and factions; there was a 
need to initiate a process capable of operationalising emerging paradigms, concepts and new 
attitudes as a means of increasing the capacity of the continent to deal with its own problems 
by responding appropriately to the challenges posed by globalisation and the new world 
order. A strategic framework of African collective solidarity was needed on issues of socio-
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economic development, integration, security and stability, democratisation and human rights. 
With regard to these broad challenges, the African Leadership Forum (ALF) in collaboration 
with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the AU organised a 
series of consultative meetings concluded in May 1991 known as the Kampala Forum (ALF, 
2008). 
During the Lome Summit in 2000 the Heads of African states realised that they needed to 
work together to maintain regional and international peace and security. Leaders were 
conscious of the persistent conflict situations and acts of violence, which were seriously 
undermining the security and stability in African states and hampering development efforts 
(UNECA, 2008,). 
Over 500 participants attended the forum from Africa and other parts of the world. The result 
of this meeting was the adoption of a comprehensive proposal for a Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA). This proposal is known as the 
Kampala Document. In part it stipulates that peace and security and stability are inseparable 
conditions and the basis for development and co-operation in Africa. The document also 
provides a framework for collective action and co-operation on continental, regional and 
international matters. It provides for co-operation amongst African states in the African 
Economic Community; joint development of common natural resources; inter-dependence 
based on beneficial co-operative relations with other developing and industrialised nations as 
well as supra-nationality based on the need to devolve certain key responsibilities to 
continental institutions (ALF, 2008). The CSSDCA is the adopted programme of the AU. 
By 2001, it also became evident that previous efforts to stop the Burundi conflict were not  
working. The AU took greater steps to ensure that warring factions met at the negotiation 
table, by using the threat of sanctions. The AU realised that there was a need for effective 
operationalisation of the various segments of the African peace and security architecture. The 
AU also realised that peace in Africa relied on a bilateral and multilateral partnership 
(Resolution Dec 225, 2001). 
The following year the first phase of Burundi’s transition was underway regardless of the 
difficulties that its government faced. There were persistent clashes between the armed 
groups, the socio-economic situation worsened and the political classes continued with their 
persistent dissension. The AU observed that there were serious violations to the Arusha peace 
agreement. To further frustrate peace efforts, there was latent conflict between the two large 
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political groupings of the country, namely the G10 and G7, resulting in what was considered 
the inequitable distribution of the post within the Transition Institutions. Within each of these 
groups there was also the discovery of massacres in the district that they occupied (Report on 
the 86
th
 Ordinary Session of the Central Organ Mechanism, 2002). 
Throughout September 2002, the AU expressed its concern regarding the massacres and 
political discord that was taking place. The AU was also aware that the massacres were 
perpetrated by the rebellion. The transitional government of Burundi had to deal with 
distinguishing rebel fighters from civilians who had been taken as hostages and used as 
human shields. The AU Commissioner appealed to the warring parties to refrain from 
violence and not to undermine the peace accord.  
The following year the AU became very concerned over the continued clashes in Burundi and 
decided to intensify its efforts aimed at stopping hostilities. The AU’s Security Council 
supported the efforts made by Zuma as the mediator. The council, mediators and Regional 
Initiative decided to intensify contact with various armed groups to encourage the armed 
groups to seriously pursue negotiations. 
The AU was in favour of the ceasefire agreement. The agreement provided for a monitoring 
and central mechanism led by the UN and AU. The document provided for the setting up of  
joint liaison teams that compromised of representatives of the signatory parties, the UN and 
the AU. Neither the UN nor the AU could get Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD to negotiate with 
the transition government during the early stages of the negotiations. Nkurunziza as the AU 
89
th
 Central Organ for Conflict Prevention Report (2002) stated that there were preconditions 
that he maintained  posed  considerable obstacles to the negotiation process. 
The security situation in Burundi did not improve during this period. The cycle of violence 
varied depending on the context in which it was occured. In July 2002, there was a 
resurgence of attacks among the armed group. The 86
th
 Report of the Conflict Prevention 
(2002) explained the situation as: “No doubt triggered by their determination to achieve 
success on the ground so as to engage in the ceasefire negotiations...from a position of 
strength.” The security situation was further threatened by the increased assassinations 
targeting local and administrative authorities as well as the increasing amount of organised 
crime and armed robbery situations.     
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Moreover, the violence that plagued Burundi during 2002 led to an increase of abuse and 
violence against the civilian population. Many people were displaced. During the period, the 
AU mission pursued contacts with other partners to exchange ideas on the best possible steps 
to soften the position of all parties. Not only was the AU involved in the ceasefire 
negotiations process but was also closely involved in various activities organised by the UN 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ministry of Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation of displaced person and returnees. The mission held regular talks with the two 
institutions on the progress of repatriation of the Burundian refugees residing in Tanzania. 
The AU also decided to create a construction project the “OAU village” for which the AU 
Commission made US$75 000 available. 
3.4 AU as an institution involved in the peace process    
By 2003 the situation did not improve, especially between the political groupings in the 
country. Several parties from all sides of the political spectrum claimed they were excluded 
from decision-making and were not adequately represented within the major institutions of 
the country. The differences that arose triggered tension that led to attacks. In October 2003 
the Ceasefire Agreement was signed but there were various groups that opposed it and this 
led to socio-political turmoil. Before the end of that year the ceasefire agreement was violated 
and a resurgence of violence reached the capital (88
th
 Session of the AU, 2003). 
By December 2003, Zuma recognised: “that the uniqueness of the peace process in Burundi 
made direct involvement of the UN difficult.” Zuma therefore suggested that the UN should 
rather demonstrate creativity and innovation to support the African mission as well as other 
implementation structures and provide humanitarian assistance to the combatants. Mbeki, 
who was Chairperson of the AU, also took a number of initiatives aimed at backstopping the 
ceasefire implementation process. One suggestion was that an African Mission  be deployed 
and countries to be approached to contribute troops (88
th
 Session of AU, 2003). 
Steps were underway to ensure the deployment of the mission, especially considering the 
fragility of the situation in Burundi. More specifically, both political and technical 
officialsattended a meeting in Addis Ababa to exchange views of the nature of the mission, 
what it would entail, its conditions for its deployment, its modus operandi, its funding and the 
contribution that would be expected from the AU (88
th
 Session of AU, 2003). 
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Although the combatants agreed to a ceasefire, the situation on the ground remained 
extremely fragile, especially when both Burundian armed forces and segments of the CNDD-
FDD violated the agreement. Due to this, the timely deployment of the African Mission was 
important so as not to undermine the progress achieved after years of painstaking 
negotiations. The AU realised that the deployment of troops had to be sped-up. Through 
consultation with Zuma they had to find the best way and means to speed up the ceasefire 
implementation process. The AU Central Organ also reaffirmed its support for the on-going 
process, in particular the deployment of the mission (88
th
 Session of AU, 2003). Member 
states were further urged to lend their support to the ongoing efforts of the AU and AMIB. 
The principal mandate of AMIB, which was to be deployed for a period of one year, was to 
oversee and evaluate the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The mission also 
facilitated the activities of the joint ceasefire commission and the technical committees for 
the restructuring of the national defence and police forces; secured the identified assembly 
and withdrawal areas; facilitated the supply of technical assistance for the disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process; and facilitate timely supply of humanitarian 
assistance.   
AMIB had a budget of US$190 million and a total strength of 3225 men for their initial 
period. One of the problems that the mission faced was the task of mobilising the required 
resources. As noted in the 3
rd
 Ordinary Session of the Executive Council Report (2003), the 
AU stated that it devoted a lot of effort in the situation in Burundi and would “spare no effort 
to contribute to the final resolution of the Burundian crisis.” 
By 2004 substantial progress was made in the peace process. Regardless of the limited 
financial resources at its disposal, the AMIB managed to carry out its mission with 
competence. Therefore, on 21 May 20014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) authorised the 
deployment of a peacekeeping operation in Burundi. However, the ninth session of the 
Security Council Communiqué (2004) requested that the AU maintain an observer mission in 
Burundi to support the implementation of the peace process and to facilitate cooperation with 
the UN peacekeeping operation. 
The UN peacekeeping operation took over from the African Mission by June 2004, thereby 
aiding the successful conclusion of the process initiated in that country through the signing of 
the 2000 Arusha Ceasefire Agreement. AMIB provided an invaluable contribution for the 
defrosting of the political climate and the restoration of security in 16 out of the 17 provinces. 
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Toward the end of AMIB’s tenure in Burundi, the only armed movement that had not joined 
the peace process was the Palipehutu-FNL. 
3.5 Interplay between AU and International community 
AMIB was set-up with the knowledge that the UN would take over the operation as soon as 
security was improved in the country. As noted above, the UN was asked to have limited 
involvement with the AMIB, but the UN did provide financial and humanitarian assistance 
during the process. As noted by the 5
th
 Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of the UN 
(2004), the mission in Burundi (ONUB) had an initial duration of six months. ONUB had a 
maximum of 5650 military officers, which was initially composed of segments of the AMIB.      
According to Bellamy and Williams (2005:192), AMIB became caught up in international 
differences on how best to resolve the civil war. “Zuma publicly questioned the Tanzanian 
and Ugandan role in supplying weapons to various factions and objected to these states’ 
troops being deployed as part of AMIB.” The financial difficulties were also great. Mamadou 
Bah pointed out in late 2003 that of the US$120 million funding that was required for the 
year,  only US$20 million had been made available. Despite these difficulties, by December 
2003 AMIB had contributed to a far more stable security situationin Burundi. 
ONUB was conceptualised as a fully-fledged multifunctional mission. According to Boshoff 
and Vey (2010: 64), when AMIB was deployed in 2003 it was under considerable pressure 
from the transitional government of Burundi as well as the international community. When 
AMIB set up a cantonment at Muyange, the site had no infrastructure, food or medical 
supplies. By August 2003, the European Union (EU) had to supply the food.  
The lack of infrastructure meant that ex-combatants/soldiers had to build their own shelters. 
UNICEF donated plastic shelters to AMIB. The German Cooperation Agency (GTA) 
supplied AMIB with protected conveys. The World Health Organisation (WHO) donated 
medical supplies. The World Bank provided finance for the DDR process (Boshoff and Vey, 
2010:65). 
According to Boshoff and Vey (2010: 75) the deployment of ONUB’s mandate was the result 
of a series of formal requests by the President of Burundi and the facilitation team led by 
Zuma to transform AMIB into a UN peacekeeping operation. 
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Zuma considered the situation stable enough to ask the UN to take over from AMIB as set 
out in the peace accord. Then UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan suggested that the security 
situation remained precarious and that peace was more likely if the living conditions of the 
local population was improved. However, this was still a problem by December 2003. 
AMIB’s main challenge was that it could not make serious progress on disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration and to deter all spoiler groups who turned criminal as 
opposed to political violent (Bellamy and Williams, 2005:193).     
3.6 UN in Burundi 
As mentioned in section one, peace must be kept no matter how fragile it is. One of the 
conditions for UN peacekeeping is there should be peace to keep.  Former UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace building as a post conflict phase where 
international and national actors identify and support structures which will strengthen and 
solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into armed conflict. Over the years the notion has 
been extended to re-building or establishing at least a minimally functional state in order to 
undertake political and economic reforms and maintaining peace in the long run. The focus of 
peace building is on the importance of state institutions while emphasis is placed on non-state 
actors (Menocal, 2011: 1717).  
The UN determined that the situation in Burundi constituted a threat to international peace 
and security in the region. Therefore, under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter, the provision 
allows for the use of force to restore or maintain international peace. The Security Council, 
through Resolution 1545 paragraph 5 (2004), established the ONUB. The resolution stated 
that the ONUB’s mandate was to: 
 Ensure respect for the ceasefire agreement through the implementation and investigate 
its violations; 
 Promote the re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces monitor 
and provide security at pre-disarmament assembly sites, collect weapons and military 
material to dispose of; 
 Carry out disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national programme of 
DDR of combatants; 
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 Monitor the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, as 
well as the disarmament and demobilisation of the elements that need to be disarmed 
and demobilised; 
  Monitor the illegal flow of arms across national borders; 
 Contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of the 
humanitarian assistance, and facilitate the voluntary return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons; 
 Contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the 
Arusha Agreement to ensure that a secure environment for free, transparent and 
peaceful elections take place;  
  Protect civilians under limited threat of physical violence without prejudice to the 
responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi; 
 Ensure the protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well 
as the security and freedom of movement of ONUBs personnel, and to coordinate and 
conduct mine action activities in support of its mandate. 
Burundi’s peace came after 12 years of war. ONUB was deployed towards the end of a very 
long engagement. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in December 2002, UN 
officials revisited the question of mounting a UN peacekeeping operation. For months after, 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was urged to be cautious. Internal 
discussions were held to consider whether the continued absence of FNL from the peace 
process was enough of a reason to continue urging delays. The continued difficulties AMIB 
was facing made a strong case for an operation (Jackson, 2006:9). 
The 2004 Secretary-General’s Report on Burundi stated that despite the difficulties that 
existed in the country, his assessment found that significant progress had been made in 
achieving a comprehensive and all-inclusive peace process. The report further stated that the 
parties had an understanding that continued armed hostilities would not enable them to reach 
their political objectives.     
In January 2004, two missions visited Burundi; first a joint AU/EU/UN mission to work with 
counterpart from AMIB, to review financial and logistical arrangements to sustain AMIB 
until the UN could take over. The second mission was a UN multi-dimensional 
reconnaissance mission to make recommendation on a possible UN peacekeeping operation 
including “rehatting” of AMIB. The two visit recommendations formed the substance of the 
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Secretary-General’s March 2004 Report and contributed to shaping the operation’s mandate 
(Jackson, 2006:9).  
Canadian UN Special Representative Carolyn Metskie headed the mission. ONUB 
experienced delays in obtaining troops and deployment was slow. One of the UN’s earliest 
tasks was the provision of security to refugees after a massacre of 160 Congolese 
Banyamulengne refugees at a transit camp in the Burundian town of Gatumba. According to 
Adebajo (2011:77), by November 2004 despite the  UN's  5526 peacekeepers who were 
assisted by the ‘rehatting’ of AMIB troops, armed skirmishes continued. 
Although 7329 Burundian combatants were demobilised between December 2004 and April 
2005, internal political divisions among the members of the transitional government 
continued. The UN Commissioner with regional states and the transitional government 
mediated these issues through meetings (Adebajo, 2011: 78). 
According to Jackson (2006:11), the conventional wisdom of the UN to try and keep peace 
“where there is peace to keep” is never clear in practice. ONUB’s history demonstrated that 
the UN successfully resisted significant pressure to deploy a peace operation until the peace 
process was all but irreversible ripe, and therefore the UN’s contribution could be more 
effective. The period to complete the transition established by the Arusha peace agreement 
was a strict one and any deviation risked creating the impression of a crisis in the peace 
process. When ONUB was deployed less than five months remained until the official end of 
the Transition was to be completed. 
Over the course of such a lengthy peace process, an informal but mutually understood 
division of labour emerged among the regional and international actors. An overt relationship 
with armed groups became the preserve of South Africa. From late 2004 to 2005, ONUB had 
sent necessary signals and took actions towards the CNDD-FDD showing that it did not have 
an interest in who would take power after the elections. To ensure that ONUB remained 
objective, ONUB leadership took important steps to meet with Nkurunziza because the UN 
was aware that he would remain a key player in Burundian politics (Jackson, 2006:12). 
Williams (2006:356) criticised the UNSC for taking a long time to intervene in Burundi: “In 
situations where the UNSC is actively engaged in a crisis, the AU should refrain from using 
force with the Council authorisation. The issue in more complicated in cases like Burundi 
where UNSC constituently refused to establish a peacekeeping force where one was needed.” 
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Schweiger (2006:656) in agreement with this view stated that the UN acted with hesitance in 
Burundi. 
However, the UN did respond and ONUB’s mission was extended up until June 2006 when 
Resolution 1652 prolonged it to 1 December 2006. UNSC Resolution 1791 paragraph 5 
(2007) replaced ONUB with the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). BINUB was a 
DPKO-led peace building support mission and included an integrated Sector Security Reform 
(SSR) and small arms and light weapons (SALW) section composed of both DPKO and UN 
Development Programs (UNDP) staff. 
3.6.1 Challenges ONUB faced 
The UN’s actions were not only hampered by the lack of comprehension of the SSR concept 
and strategy, but also had limited human and financial resources available. There was also the 
problem of coordination. Cooperation and communication within the UN system consisted of 
information sharing and dialogue. Cooperation worked well among UN entities on the ground 
with regular meetings between the UNDP, UNHCR and various sections of ONUB. 
However, coordination was lacking with Burundian authorities that had to frequently repeat 
themselves in interactions with multiple UN interlocutors who did not coordinate among 
themselves (Banal and Scherrer, 2007:51). 
Although a productive working relationship was fostered, the relationship between the 
ONUB and Burundian authorities was at times troubled. Regular meetings were held twice a 
month to work towards different goals such as facilitation of the search for potential partners 
capable of filling gaps that the UN could not address. Another problem was that the needs of 
the Burundian authorities were not always understood or taken into account. For example, 
while some representatives of ONUB perceived the excessive military presence in the streets 
as a sign of the army's lack of professionalism, their national counterparts saw it as the 
concrete result of a lack of funds to build barracks. Another issue was the way ONUB 
handled the move from the transitional government to establishing a working relationship 
with elected authorities instead of being a neutral third party. International and local 
authorities were of the opinion that ONUB wanted to impose reforms after sufficient 
consultation with the authorised representatives of the government ministries were done 
(Banal and Scherrer, 2007:53). 
3.7 Conclusion 
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According to Jackson (2006:3) the UN provided the people of Burundi with support and 
encouragement for a reform to peace: 
Between 1993 and 2004, that support was limited largely to attempts at quiet 
diplomacy...Burundi’s success is thus the outcome of a sustained process in 
which domestic and international/multilateral actors were called upon to 
interact in complex complementary ways. The United Nations was challenged 
at each stage to identify the most productive mode in which to be of 
assistance. 
As this section highlighted, each institution had ideas on how and what peacekeeping should 
entail. The transformation of peacekeeping from the regional actor to an international actor 
can be identified by the ideas or doctrines of peacekeeping; information that the institution 
receives and the whether the relationship that exists between the two can be of assistance to 
one another.  
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SECTION FOUR: Somalia conflict and IGAD intervention 
4.1 Introduction 
This section deals with the next case study, Somalia. In terms of peacekeeping Somalia does 
not have a full transformation, with only local and regional actors involved with its 
peacekeeping mission. Furthermore, Somali’s peacekeeping mission was supposed to be 
similar to of AMIB's. This is because it should have eventually become a UN mission. For 
the purpose of this section the study will focus on the Somalia conflict and the intervention of 
the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 
Somalia is strategically located on the Horn of Africa along the southern approaches to Bab 
el Mondeb en route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The country suffers from recurring 
droughts, which is a cause for its insecurity as agriculture is the most important sector. 
Livestock normally account for 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads 
and semi-pastoralists that are dependent on livestock make up a large portion of the 
population. 85% of the population are Somali, Bantu while other non-Somali residents 
(including 30 000 Arabs) make up the rest of the population (CIA, 2013).  
As mentined above the territory of Somalia can be identified by the former Somali Republic 
(1960-71), and the people are comprised of the Somali living in Somalia and from other 
communities including those living in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and the wider Diaspora. 
Before the collapse of the government in 1991, the quest for a “Greater Somali” was a very 
real threat to neighbouring countries. Unsuccessful attempts to enforce this claim through 
military means in the 1960s occurred when the government in Mogadishu sent arms in 
support of the rebellions in the Ogaden, Bale and Sidand regions of Ethiopia and Kenya’s 
Northern Frontier Districts. Siyad Barre made the most forceful attempt in 1977 when his 
troops invaded Ethiopia. The claim to neighbouring countries has not disappeared 
(Anonymous, 2002: 249). 
4.2 Tracing the Somali conflict 
The Somali social and political structure consists loosely of clan families and clans who 
subdivide into sub-clans primary lineages and “dia-paying" groups. The dia-paying 
(Jilib/Bah) is the most stable unit; membership is made of family units ranging from a few 
hundred to more than a thousand. Somali society has always been divided into nomadic 
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pastoralist in the north and the agro-pastoralists in the south, which have different cultural, 
linguistic and social structures (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 11). 
Institutional structures incorporated concepts alien to Somali institutions under colonial rule. 
A consequence of this is that a discrepancy emerged between the highly decentralised 
pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the post-colonial state. A possible cause 
for the conflict can be traced to the rapid union of the two Somali territories to form a 
“United” Somalia state in 1960. The constitution of the unified Somali territories guaranteed 
democracy and a forum that sanctioned multiparty-ism and de jure freedom of expression. 
Somalia had more parties per capita than any other democratic country except in Israel. 
During the March 1969 election, more than 60 parties contested. Against this backdrop, in 
1969 a successful coup brought Siad Barre to power (Ahmed and Green: 1999:115). 
Once in power Barre immediately suspended the constitution and banned all forms of 
political and professional association. He promised to cure all problems that the country 
faced; he adopted Scientific Socialism, an ideology which was fully compatible with Islam. 
One of the political and legal changes that were introduced was a repressive security 
apparatus accountable to Barre himself. Furthermore, within a few years Barre’s socialised 
most of the sectors of the economy which were brought under government ownership 
(Ahmed and Green, 1999: 117). 
4.2.1 Drought year’s start of dissension 
Due to socialist experimentation and political hostility, the 1974 – 75 droughts were turned 
into a major famine in the north. There was a serious shortage of food and a collapse of 
entitlements throughout the northern regions. Government’s response was to force the 
pastoralists to engage in farming whether they had the experience or not. An attempted coup 
in April 1978 was crushed, but some of the Majerteen clan fled to Ethiopia and established 
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). By 1979 there were 1.3 million refugees in 
the country, and the pastoralists were reduced to second-class citizens. The second main 
opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM), was formed in 1981 by a 
group of businessmen, religious leaders, and intellectuals and former army officers drawn 
from the Isaaq clan. In Italy 1987 the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress (USC) was 
formed. In 1989 the Ogandani-led Somali Patriotic Movement was formed (Ahmed and 
Green, 1999:19). 
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4.2.2 The conflict begins 
On 9 July 1989, the bishop of Mogadishu was shot and killed. The violence increased on 14 
July 1989 when government troops opened fire on Muslim worshippers as they were leaving 
Friday noon prayer. The violence sparked fear. According to Simons (1994: 818) it seemed 
that the city was becoming unglued as a result of a national government run by a president 
increasingly mocked as nothing more than the Mayor of Mogadishu. Two years later the 
government of Somalia fell. 
Two powerful warlords, Mohamed Farah Aided and Ali Mahdi Mohammed from USC 
battled for control of the capital. In Kismayo two warlords, General Siad Moran and Colonel 
Oar Jess fought for control, while north-western Somaliland eventually declared itself an 
independent republic. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent Algerian diplomat 
Mohamed Sahnoun to Somali as his special representative in April 1992 (Adebajo, 2011: 
174). 
During this time, the UNSC established the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) which will 
be discussed in the next section. However, Somali warlords blocked food conveys and 
UNOSOM unarmed military observers were unable to stop them. 300 000 deaths resulted and 
one million refugees spilled to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kea. The deteriorating security 
situation led to a 38 301 peacekeeping mission led by 25 426 Americans entering Somali in 
December 1992 as part of a Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (Adebajo, 2011: 174). 
Another drought hit the area in 1991-92 at the height of the civil war. Famine killed between 
300 000 and 500 000 people and affected as many three million people. The war in the South 
created a huge displacement of people uprooting over one-third of the entire population in the 
South. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to pay factional militias to 
provide security for the distribution of emergency relief of US$100 000 per week, the CARE 
had to pay US$100 000 per month on bodyguards to carry out its relief distribution activities. 
The UN realised that through paying militias, even if involuntarily, the war economy was 
encouraged and disarmament discouraged (Ahmed and Green, 1999: 121). 
 4.2.3 Changing nature of the conflict 
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Attempts to carve out independent political entities after the collapse of the Barre regime 
have been hampered by the reluctance of most African countries and the OAU to recognise 
and accept the separatist movements. Despite the disappearance of its central government, 
Somalia continued to exist as a state. The Somalia seat at the UN remained vacant, and the 
OAU suspended, not abolished, Somalia’s membership. Numerous attempts between 1993 
and 2000 were made to revive or reconstruct a central authority through various 
reconciliation conferences, but Somalia remained a failed state (Anonymous, 2002: 251). 
Since the early 1990s significant changes occurred in the nature and intensity of the conflict. 
The conflicts became more localised and less bloody and criminality more constrained by 
customary law and private security forces. Somalia’s political elites that were quarrelling 
among themselves failed to establish a central administrative authority during the 1990s. This 
has led to many problems such as an increase in criminality and the armed conflict. However, 
there were certain places, communities, towns and regions that enjoyed relatively high levels 
of peace and lawfulness (Menkhaus, 2003: 407). 
Armed clashes at the height of the civil war were generally localised, brief and much less 
costly. Some areas such as Puntland were almost entirely spared from war in the 1990s, while 
others have enjoyed relatively long periods of peace since 1995. In the early 1990s fighting 
was mainly inter-clan in nature, an example of which was the conflict between the largest 
clan families in the south, the Darood versus the Hawiye. Both sides committed atrocities (the 
massacre and rape of civilians from enemy clans or weak and defenceless clans caught in the 
middle of the clashes). Furthermore, the clan-families waged deadly internal quarrels. The 
intra-Hawiye spilt between Abgal and Gedir erupted into warfare. Extensive use of mortar 
and rocket propelled grenades levelled most of the capital’s centre and heavy fighting was 
waged over single city blocks. Tensions within the Darood culminated in clashes around 
Kismayo pitting Ogaden clan militias led by Colonel Oma Jess against SPM (Menkhuas, 
2003: 410). 
According to Menkhaus (2006: 83), from 1996 a type of sub-national governance was 
resented in the country. The politics found in these regional and trans-regional areas were 
similar to that of clan homelands. These regional and local administrations have tended to be 
tools of domination used by larger or more powerful clans to wield against weaker groups. 
Many self-declared authorities installed themselves as an occupational force. For example, in 
the Gedo region the Marehan clan monopolised political and economic life at the expense of 
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the Rahanweyn and other clans in the region. In return, the Rahanweyn declared non-
Rahanweyn clan members to be outsiders in the Bay region, even a sizable portion of the 
non-Rahanweyn Somali’s lived and worked in the Bay region prior to the war. 
In 2004, national reconciliation talks produced an agreement for the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) led by President Abdullahi Yusuf. Many Somali’s viewed the TNG as a 
narrow coalition dominated by clans of the President and his Prime Minister, Mohamed 
Ghudi. By early 2005, a serious split emerged within the TNG between Yusuf supporters and 
the Mogadishu Group. By 2006 war erupted between the two wings of the Mogadishu Group 
themselves (Menkhaus, 2009: 225). The two-year period of 2007-08 was as bad and 
disastrous as the civil war and famine of 1991-92.  
According to Menkhaus (2009:224): 
A fierce insurgency and counter-insurgency pitting Ethiopian occupying 
forces against armed resistance led by the radical Islamist group Al-Shabaab 
devastated the country and polarised politics in Somali still further. Somalia 
staggered into the year 2009 as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with 1.3 
million internally displaced persons and 3.5 million people in need of 
emergency aid. 
4.3 The peace process 
The first attempts at reconciliation aimed at re-establishing a government in Somalia took 
place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. The agreement endorsing Ali Mahdi as president was 
rejected and a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the rejected president ensued. Two years 
later, 15 parties involved in the civil war signed two agreements for national reconciliation 
and disarmament. However, fighting continued and the agreement fell apart. Between 
November 1996 and January 1997, a conference on national reconciliation was held in 
Sodere, Ethiopia. The meeting created a 41 member National Salvation Council (NSC) 
charged with arranging a transitional government. The government of Somaliland and 
General Aidid’s son Hussain Farrah Aidid who replaced him boycotted the conference. In 
December 2000 a fourth reconciliation meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt and had 28 
signatories. The agreement left Somalia without a national leader but provided for a 13 
person Council of Presidents, a Prime Minister and a national assembly (AMISOM, 2013). 
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Menkhaus (2009: 224) further noted that most Somalis were bewildered by the external 
policies that have laid waste to their already poor country while simultaneously promising to 
support peace-building efforts. At the start of the millennium Somali remained an orphaned 
country. Djibouti President, Ismael Omar Guelleh in early 2000, launched the Arta process. 
The Arta process focused on clan leaders and civil society and decided to sideline faction 
leaders. This was a daring approach because it not only ignored those who held military 
power, but tried to build national unity of the foundation of clan structures. By the end of 
August, the 25 000 delegates who gathered at Arta adopted a Transitional National Charter 
(TNC) and elected a 225 member Transitional National Assembly as well as a transitional 
president (Anonymous, 2002:252). 
According to Mosley (2012:2), the decision-making around the transition was narrowed 
down to a handful of signatories and key international financial backers of the process. 
Dissenting voices were not only ignored, but were branded as spoilers by the TNG, IGAD, 
AU, UN and Western backers such as the US and UK. The establishment of the TNC 
widened the idea that the solution was imposed on Somalia. 
In March 2001, Yusuf met with 17 other Somalian political groups and alliances in Awasa, 
Ethiopia, where the Somalia Reconciliation and Resolution Council (SRRC) was formed to 
oppose the Arta process and the TFG in order to promote the formation of a federal Somalian 
state (Accord, 2010: 33). The reconciliation meeting produced a ceasefire agreement signed 
by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary 
one established at Arta. 
In September 2003, at the 15
th
 National Reconciliation conference in Nairobi, Kenya the 
TNG and the SRRC agreed to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The 
conference was successfully concluded with the formal adoption of a Federal Transitional 
Charter. In January 2004, a conference in Nairobi saw the development of the TFG. The 
major factions signed the Declaration on the Harmonisation of Various Issues proposed by 
the Somali delegation. The agreement established transitional institutions and elections, and 
in August 2004 a Transitional Federal Parliament was established. 
4.4 IGAD’s idea of peacekeeping 
IGAD’s efforts to mediate in the Somalia conflict were affected by the complex legacy of the 
Cold War on what were in effect regional conflicts. IGAD was established in 1984 and tasked 
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with addressing issues pertaining to drought and desertification. But the IGAD realised that it 
would be counterproductive to pursue these initiatives without addressing the issue of conflict 
in the sub-region. IGAD adopts different strategies to address some of the fundamental 
problems that the Horn of Africa faces (Murithi, 2009:139).   
In 1884, the six countries in the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan 
and Uganda took action through the UN to establish an intergovernmental body for 
development and drought control in the region. In 1993, Eritrea became a member but 
suspended its membership in 2007. On 21 March 1996 in Nairobi the intergovernmental body 
was revitalised to focus on regional cooperation (IGAD, 2010). 
IGAD’s peace and security division has three main programme components: conflict 
prevention, management and resolution; political affairs; and humanitarian affairs. The 
objective was to ensure that there is security in the sub-region and that humanitarian suffering 
of the region is addressed. The region suffers from natural disasters and conflicts and as a 
result refugees and displaced persons are found in all member states. The agreement 
establishing IGAD (2013) article 7(g) states that the aim and objective of the authority is “to 
promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region 
for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-state conflicts through 
dialogue.”  
Article 6 of the same documentation states that the member states principles are non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states, the peaceful settlement of inter and intra 
state conflicts through dialogue and maintaining of regional peace and stability and security. 
As shown below IGAD members did not adhere to the principles. 
In 2002, IGAD attempted to establish a peace process through a meeting. The meeting sought 
to address the obstacles to forging peace even as it faced “a combination of mismanagement, 
regional rivalry, insufficient outside political support and financial support” (Murithi, 
2009:147).  
In 2003, IGAD member states sought to intensify efforts aimed at enhancing democracy in 
order to ensure stability and security in the sub-region. Nonetheless, IGAD has been stymied 
by the mutually destructive Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, which has paralysed its functions at the 
highest level. After a bitter feud over Somalia during an IGAD summit in Nairobi in April 
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2007, Eritrea suspended its membership, blaming Ethiopia and the US for interference in 
Somalia (Khadiagala, 2008: 12). 
The Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of Minister on the Somalia Reconciliation 
process drew a plan to deploy troops under the IGASOM mandate. A fact-finding mission 
was also sent to Somalia to assess the feasibility for such an operation. In May 2005 a 
coherent plan was presented to IGAD’s Council of Ministers and forwarded to the AU Peace 
and Security Council. But IGAD member states lacked the political will to see the initiative 
through (Murithi, 2009:147).     
Murithi (2009:147) states: 
IGAD at the time did not possess an in-house capacity and framework to 
rapidly deploy peacekeepers to member states. Above all, IGAD’s charter did 
not have a provision for the deployment of a peace operation... there was also 
no consensus among the various Somali factions about the appropriateness of 
a peacekeeping force in the country.  
4.5 The interplay between IGAD and Somalia 
According to Khadiagala (2008: 10), the cycle of despair and disaster in Eastern Africa is 
reflected in fragile states, weak societies, and fragile socio-economic environments that have 
been buffeted by wars. Eastern African states have a history of weak regional institutions. 
The socio-economic disparities, social heterogeneities and geographical boundaries have 
made it difficult to create a stable regional security identity in the IGAD region. Culturally 
and historical various fault lines, which had been politicised, crisscross the region.    
However, IGAD led to the mediation initiatives that produced the TFG in Somalia. Before 
the fall of the Islamist group in Mogadishu in December 2006, IGAD had been at the 
forefront of effects to send missions to stabilise the situation. In March 2005, IGAD proposed 
a Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM) including 10 000 troops, but the AU 
approved a smaller force of 8 000 troops in September 2006 (Khadiagala, 2008:10). 
The presence of both IGASOM and the Ethiopian military presence did not guarantee that the 
TFG would restore peace in Somalia. The resurgence of the Islamists under Eritrean guidance 
added another layer of complexity to the regionalised civil war (Khadiagala, 2008:10). One 
of the challenges that IGAD faced in Somalia was that Somalis were unhappy with the results 
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of the peace processes and raised questions about the legitimacy of the leaders selected to 
represent Somalia. The Somalis claimed that the IGAD mediators had convened and 
empowered warlords in the talks (Menkhaus, 2007: 341). 
4.6 Interest of IGAD in Somalia  
In Somalia, some events have undermined the peace process to perpetuate the armed conflict, 
and others have added only to undercut local efforts to improve law and order and reduce 
criminality. By distinguishing between local interest on armed conflict, criminality and state 
collapse, one can make sense of the puzzling behaviour of Somalia’s political, civic and 
economic actors who promote peace and local policing systems, while quietly undermining 
efforts to revive the state. The tendency of external actors to conflate state building and 
peace-building initiatives has tended to obscure these important distinctions (Menkhaus, 
2006: 76). 
As mentioned above, the Arta process was initiated by Guelleh.Only at a later stage was it 
supported by IGAD. During the process IGAD members harboured their own individual 
agendas with regard to Somalia. In particular, Ethiopia sought to influence and control any 
IGAD initiative. In February 2005, the AU authorised IGAD to send a peace mission to 
Somalia. The IGAD’s mandate was to oversee the voluntary disarmament of the militia, 
while the IGASOM mission was to protect the TFN and prepare the ground for an AU force 
within nine months after its deployment (Murithi, 2009: 147). 
In December 2006, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia. The effect of the 2007-08 Ethiopian 
occupation made Somalia much more dangerous. Ethiopia had hoped that the invasion would 
make Somalia less of a threat. For some, the Ethiopian occupation was authorised and 
directed by the US (Menkhaus, 2006 and Adebajo, 2011). 
The 33
rd
 Ordinary Meeting of the IGAD’s Council of Ministers held in Djibouti in 2009 
approved a strategic plan for the re-establishing of effective government institutions in 
Somalia. During this period, AMISOM was in place but extremist groups Al-Shabaab and 
Hezbollah Islam militia continued to carry out attacks against the TFG leadership and 
peacekeepers. Communiqué stated that extremist groups had the full backing and support of 
international terrorist groups and Eritrea. 
Any IGAD mediation effort was subsequently undermined by this development since the 
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) refused to negotiate with the TFG as long as Ethiopian troops 
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were in the country. IGASOM never deployed to Somalia because it required that the UN 
arms embargo on Somalia be lifted so that its troops could be adequately armed to undertake 
its mission (Murithi, 2009: 48).       
Furthermore, Ethiopia’s occupation represented a misguided mission that was utterly unable 
to stem the reckless bloodbath in Mogadishu. Adebajo stated that (2011: 75): “It was more of 
an auxiliary of Pax Americana’s erratic ‘war on terrorism’ than a mission to promote 
sustainable peace.” 
Ethiopia has been deploying troops in Somalia since 1992 in order to protect its southern 
border and prevent a hostile government in Mogadishu from forging an alliance with Eritrea. 
Kenya’s interest in Somali grew from links between economic integration and security plus 
the terrorist attack on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. This 
forced the determination from security regionalism to supplement national efforts in the 
context of permeable borders and contagious conflicts (Khadiagala, 2009: 433). 
Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Libya, Sudan and Egypt have contributed funds, arms and technical 
supports for UIC to gain control of Somali territory. Eritrea’s support for the courts rests on 
its strategic enmity towards Ethiopia. The Islamic Courts at one point held more territory than 
the TFG and had poplar support. Somalia’s fluid and undetermined political affairs have 
provided both Ethiopia and Eritrea with a proxy to use against the other. Kenya has been the 
most active and effective broker in the region on Somali issues, under the auspices of IGAD. 
However, by 2006 pressure from Kenya’s substantial ethnic Somali population had caused it 
to default to a position of neutrality, but Nairobi has pushed for negotiations. Uganda and 
Sudan have each supported each other’s rebels. Eritrea has clashed with Djibouti and Sudan 
(Ward, 2006:1).  
Rivalries between Ethiopia and Somalia runs deep. The Ethiopian government, its allies and 
its enemies all understood that the prolonged Ethiopian military occupation of Mogadishu 
would be resented by Somalia and would trigger an armed resistance. The solution that was 
proposed was the deployment of an African Union peacekeeping force to replace the 
Ethiopians. But African leaders were reluctant to commit troops into such a dangerous 
environment and after several delays were only able to muster 2 000 troops. Therefore the 
Ethiopian forces stayed and were joined in their efforts by the TFG security forces, which 
were trained by Ethiopia (Menkhaus, 2009: 226).           
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4.7 Conclusion 
The conflict in Somalia is a complex one that has experience a vast range of conflicts. It has 
had periods of all out  civil war to war between clans and within clans. Somalia’s conflict has 
a changing nature and therefore can frustrate and hinder the process. Furthermore, the local 
actor in the peacekeeping, IGAD, has internal problems that make an effective peacekeeping 
force almost impossible. Once IGAD got approval for a peace mission in Somalia it could not 
be deployed because of a UN arms embargo on Somalia. However, IGAD intervention in 
Somalia does speak to the national interest of each of its members and a willingness to help 
the peacekeeping. 
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SECTION FIVE: AU and UN peacekeeping in Somalia 
5.1 Introduction 
Although a local peacekeeping mission was not deployed to Somalia, the interplay between 
IGAD and the AU is important in explaining why a regional peacekeeping mission was 
deployed. It’s especially important because the local actor did lay the foundations for the 
peace process. This section of the study looks at the interplay between IGAD and the AU. 
Thereafter, the OAU/AU interests are discussed as well as the reason for an AU 
peacekeeping mission deployment. The section ends with the UN involvement in Somalia 
past and presence. 
 5.2 Interplay between IGAD and the AU  
The African mission in Somalia deployed successfully, despite the failure of IGASOM. 
Multiple organisations and states were involved in the planning process of IGASOM but the 
mission was not deployed. As mentioned in the previous section, IGASOM’s deployment did 
not take place because the UN did not lift the arms embargo to allow the local actors to keep 
their mandate. Furthermore, US interest in the terrorist activities in Somalia complicated the 
deployment of a local peacekeeping mission (May, 2009) 
However, the AU  stated that the reason IGASOM was not deployed was because at the time 
of the proposed March 2005 deployment, the UIC had not taken control of Mogadishu. By 
May 2006, the situation was radically different from that of the previous year. UIC was 
engaged in an armed conflict with the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter 
Terrorism (ARPCT) and was fighting for the control of Mogadishu. By June it had taken 
control of the capital (AMISOM, 2013). 
Another problem that IGASOM faced was funding. IGAD members requested IGAD 
Chairman, Ugandan President Youreni Museveni to secure funding and technical support. 
Museveni was prepared to offer soldiers to the IGAD mission, but officials in Uganda made it 
clear that the state could not afford to pay for the deployment. The deployment date was 
April 2005 but by May 2005 the force had not materialised. IGAD’s reason was a lack of 
funding and the insecurity within Somalia prevented the materialisation of the mission. 
IGAD’s request for funding by the AU for US$ 10.3 million for airlifting the first two 
battalions of peacekeepers, by the first week of June did not materialise (May, 2009). 
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Furthermore, IGAD was supposed to be a peacekeeping operation with a multinational force 
that would act as a neutral body in support of the peace process. As mentioned in the previous 
section, national interest of Somalia’s neighbours hampered the neutral presence of 
IGASOM. Certain factions within the TFG itself were also opposed to IGASOM’s presence. 
5.3 African Institution in Somalia 
As noted in section three of this paper, the OAU had a policy of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of its member states. However, from 1992 the OAU was involved in trying 
to stop the violence that ensued after the fall of the Somali government. However, the UN 
undertook one of the most expensive peacekeeping missions in the country as discussed 
below. Therefore, the OAU function was to work with the UN. 
As a peacekeeper the UN was in Somalia for three years (1992-95) but was unable to restore 
peace in the country. The UN withdrew its peacekeepers, but the OAU was determined to 
continue its efforts to resolve pending issues through its Ad Hoc Committee prepare for the 
national reconciliation conferences of Somalia. The OAU was also aware that the failure of 
UNOSOM would hamper the peace process in Somalia. OAU’s Resolution 1558 (paragraph 
3) stated that the slow peace process of Somalia’s national reconciliation would not help the 
resumption of dialogue among the various parties. Somali’s factional leadership did not 
operate on goodwill to seek reconciliation and the OAU was aware that faction leaders were 
operating in narrow self-interest. 
The OAU believed that the responsibility for peace in Somalia was ultimately the 
responsibility of the Somalis, and that the international community could only help them 
realise this objective. When the UN withdrew their troops in March 1995, the OAU realised 
that a stalemate was encountered during the peace process. OAU Resolution 1581 (paragraph 
6: 1995) stated that the international community was still needed for humanitarian assistance, 
and thus entrusted the institution to become the main body to try and assist in the restoration 
of peace and stability. 
OAU Resolution 1620 (paragraph 5: 1996) demonstrated that by 1996 the situation in 
Somalia deteriorated to such an extent that the OAU were concerned that the country would 
be plunged into generalised warfare. The OAU decided that the Tripartie Mission would 
undertake a visit to Somalia in order to maintain direct contact with the various Somali 
factions in order to determine the actual situation on the ground. The OAU was also aware 
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that other international states were supplying war material to factions in Somalia which was 
further escalating  the crisis. 
By 1998 it was clear that there were groups that were advocating the establishment of 
independent Somali states instead of one republic. This was because the groups were fighting 
between and within themselves. However, as stated in OAU Resolution 2062 (paragraph 
3:1998), the OAU was not in favour of dividing the Somalia state. The institution reiterated 
that the primary responsibility for peace in Somalia rested squarely on the shoulders of the 
Somali people. The OAU called on international states and organisations to coordinate their 
efforts with the OAU and IGAD to facilitate a settlement that would sustain peace. 
5.3.1 AMISOM 
Once the OAU transformed into the AU, serious steps were taken to address the conflict 
situation in Somalia. From 2002 till 2006 the AU expressed their support for the IGAD-led 
Somalia National Reconciliation Conference. IGAD and the AU were in constant 
consultations on monitoring mechanisms in Somalia in order to cease hostilities. The 
Communiqué on the 94
th
 Ordinary Session at the Ambassadorial level (2003) stated that the 
technical fact-finding mission to Somali between May 2003 and June 2003 conveyed: “a 
request from the Somalia parties and large sections of the population, to the AU to deploy a 
military force in Somali to carry out disarmament of military factions and other armed 
groups.” 
Despite this the deployment of the AU mission only took place in 2007. The peacekeeping 
mission had a mandate of six months but at the time of writing this is still stationed  in 
Somalia. The mission has the support of the UN. According to the 69
th
 Communiqué of the 
meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (2007) the mandate (paragraph 33) of 
AMISOM is to: 
 Provide support to the transitional federal institutions (TFI) in their efforts 
towards the stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of 
dialogue and reconciliation; 
 Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; 
 Create conducive conditions for the long-tem stabilisation, reconstruction and 
development in Somalia. 
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The AU was aware that by the time the UIC established itself as a political and military force 
within Somalia, it had links to international terrorist groups and was receiving material 
support from foreign forces. Before the Ethiopian armed occupation in December 2006, the 
UIC declared “Jihad” against Ethiopia. The UIC also started attacking areas controlled by the 
TFG and the fears of the international community were renewed, as well that the 
confrontations that would likely have regional implications (69
th
 Communiqué, paragraph 4: 
2007). 
Before the AMISOM’s deployment, the AU did request for the withdrawal of the Ethiopian 
troops, it also called for the withdrawal of other foreign troops and foreign elements from 
Somalia. In a consultative meeting between the AU, the League of Arab States and IGAD at 
the end of 2006, the parties agreed that the three institutions would undertake the necessary 
steps to implement UNSC Resolution 1725 (2006) and called for substantial international 
support for the TFG. The support would also enable the international community to provide 
assistance to address the humanitarian crisis in Somalia (69
th
 Communiqué, paragraph 20: 
2007). 
The Communiqué in paragraph 20 further stated that between 7 and 9 January 2007, the US 
had launched air attacks on al Qaeda terrorist targets near the Somali/Kenyan border. This 
attack further complicated the situation in Somalia and compromised the chances of AU 
success in its peacekeeping efforts. By the beginning of 2007, Kenya already had over 250 
000 Somali refugees. 
Moreover, Communiqué paragraph 31 stated that the inadequate security forces of the TFG 
could lead to the potential resurgence of major conflict if the Ethiopian forces were to 
withdraw without the deployment of an AU peace operation. The report also noted that the 
TFG faced a few military challenges when it came to reconciliation. These were namely: 
 Stabilisation of the security situation, including providing support for the demining 
and disposal of explosive ordinance devices; 
 Create conditions for a comprehensive DDR programme as soon as possible to rid 
the country of illegal arms; 
 Provision of technical support for the formation of the national army of Somalia by 
reforming, training and equipping it. 
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Furthermore, AMISOM was deployed with nine infantry battalions of 850 personnel each 
and a police training team, supported by maritime coastal and air components and a civilian 
component. One of the main characteristics of the six-month period deployment was that it 
was armed at contributing the critical stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear 
understanding that the mission would evolve to a UN peacekeeping mission. The UN mission 
would support the long-term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somali. This 
model was based on AMIB. 
As noted by Adebajo (2011:176), the AMISOM consisted largely of Ugandan and Burundian 
troops, and they struggled to keep peace in Mogadishu. One of the immediate challenges that 
AMISOM faced was stabilising the capital city.By 2011 AMISOM had made progress 
towards pushing back Al-Shabaab and regaining Mogadishu. The AU was only slowly able to 
make progress in terms of peace and security.  
AMISOM’s force is organised in the country. They are located on four land and maritime 
sectors. Section one is centred in Mogadishu and is used to secure the lines of communication 
for the key towns such as Afgage, Balad, Marka and Jawahar. It has 9 500 troops from 
Uganda and Burundi. Sector two is centred on southwest Somalia and is used to secure the 
towns of Afmadew, Jilib, Buale and Kismayo. It has 4500 Kenyan troops and 850 Sierra 
Leone troops. Sector three is centred on the stabilisation of Baida and its environs and it has 
2500 Ugandan and Burundian troops supported by Ethiopian forces. Sector 4 has roughly 
1000 Djiboutian soldiers with the support of Ethiopian troops in order to secure Belet Weyne 
and provide the Somali National Security Forces NSF assistance to secure other towns. 
The transition period after countless extensions was scheduled to end by 20 August 2012. 
And by the time the deadline drew near the Somali people had established a new parliament 
and elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. After 20 years, the Somali people had a new 
political framework that was based on a popular and legitimate provisional constitute. The 
provisional constitution replaced the eight years old TFG and 215 MPs were sworn into the 
new Somali Federal Parliament. 
By October 2012, all major strategic cities in Somalia (Mogadishu, Baida, Marka and 
Kismayo) were under the control of NSF and AMISOM. AMISOM was also about to reach 
its UNSC authorised strength of 17 731 uniformed personnel. Furthermore, there was a trend 
of surrender of hundreds of armed Al-Shabaab elements to the Somali government and to 
AMISOM (337
th
 Communiqué of AU Peace and Security Council, 2012). 
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On 9 December 2012, the NSF with the support of AMISOM troops captured the town of 
Jawahar. The town was a major base for Al-Shabaab when they were pushed out of other 
southern Somali areas. The capture of Jawahar improved the security for the civilian 
population. Through AMISOM the NSF was enhancing its capability through training and 
mentoring (AMISOM, 2012). 
At the 356
th
 meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council meeting (2013) AMISOM was 
enhanced to: 
 Maintain a robust posture with the required multipliers and enablers in order to 
facilitate the recovery of the areas that are still under the control of Al-Shabaab 
 Establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia’s national defence 
and public safety institutions; and 
 Enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts of the Federal Government of 
Somali (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote reconciliation human rights 
and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered areas.        
The report of the 379
th
 meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (2013) stated that as 
from February 2013 the political situation in Somalia has been improving. President 
Mohamud adopted a six-pillar plan that includes: security on rule of law, economic recovery, 
dialogue and reconciliation, service delivery, building collaborative international relations 
and regaining the unity and territorial integrity of Somali. 
The report also stated that although the security situation remained fragile it was continuing 
to improve. At the end of March 2013, AMISOM forces and NSF recovered the last stretch of 
the 240 km Mogadishu-Baida road from Al-Shabaab. However, Al-Shabba still had control 
of parts of the cities of Barawe, Jamaane, Jilib, Bualei, Baadhere, Dinsoor and Balo Bart. On 
17 Mach 2013, in anticipation of AMISOM deployment, the Ethiopian Defence forces 
withdrew from Huduur in the Bakool area. Due to a lack of helicopters AMISOM was unable 
to deploy its forces quickly and therefore NSF was unable to control of the town. Another 
advantage for AMISOM is that there were power struggles within the hierarchy of Al-
Shabaab, therefore the threat the group posed has decreased. 
5.4 Interplay between AMISOM and UN 
According to Schullam and Williams (2012:43), the massive expansion of AMISOM’s area 
of operation since early 2012, which include the whole of south-central and the associated 
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territorial waters, further stretched AMISOM’s resources. It also raised a huge logistical 
challenge because areas are difficult to reach because the roads between the cities are not 
being secured.    
The international community has made continued pledges to substantially support the 
development of an effective NSF. However, this has not materialised. In reality, although 
AMISOM does have a military element, it is essentially a peace support operation with the 
additional tasks of acting as a  VIP protection unit and facilitating  humanitarian relief for 
some of Mogadishu’s residents. The temp of AMISOM’s operations has outstripped the UN’s 
ability to meet its logistical requirements and to make rapid operational decisions about 
procurement needs (Scullman and Williams, 2012: 43). 
However, the UNSC through Resolution 1744 (2007) authorised an AU mission. The UN 
made it clear that the AU member states had to contribute to the mission in order to create 
conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somali. Despite authorising 
AMISOM, the UN decided to remain actively seized from the situation in Somalia.    
The UN did not lift the arms embargo on Somali. However, it did lift the embargo according 
to Resolution 1766 (2007) for the supply and technical assistance from states intending to 
help develop security sector institutions consistent with the political process set out in 
Resolution 1744. The UN further stated that the flows of weapons and ammunition supplies 
to and through Somalia were in violation of the arms embargo and constituted a serious threat 
to its peace and security. The AU and the UN coordinated a mandate on what was need for 
AMISOM to succeed.  
5.5 The UN in Somalia 
At the time of writing this dissertation, the UN has remained actively seized from the 
situation in Somalia (Resolution 2124, paragraph 31: 2013). However, it is important to note 
that the UN has been involved in Somalia. Its first peacekeeping as noted in section four was 
in 1992, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM I). 
On 27 December 1991, outgoing UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Guellar informed the 
UNSC that he intended to take an initiative to restore peace in Somalia. In January 1992, 
Secretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah led a team of senior UN officials into 
Somalia for talks aimed at bringing about an end to hostilities and acquire security access to 
the international relief community for civilians caught in the conflict. The results were shared 
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with then Secretary-General Bouros-Ghali who along with the UNSC decided on an 
appropriate cause of action (UNOSOM, 2013). 
The UNSC, through Resolution 733 (1992), urged all parties involved in the conflict to end 
fighting and decided that states should immediately implement a general and complete 
embargo of all the deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. On 17 March 
1992, the UNSC adopted Resolution 746 to dispatch a technical team to prepare for a 
ceasefire monitoring mechanism. On 24 April 1992, Resolution 751 established the UN 
operation in Somalia. The mandate was to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and to provide 
protection and security for the UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaport and 
airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres.          
The mandate of UNOSOM was further extended on 28 August 1992 through Resolution 775 
to enable protection for humanitarian convoys. By December 1992, the situation in Somalia 
had further deteriorated and through Resolution 794 (1992) the UNSC authorised member 
states to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish a safe environment. 
On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted a report that requested the transition of 
UNITAF to UNOSOM II. UNITAF deployed 37 000 troops in southern Somali, but its 
efforts did not create a secure situation in Somalia. Therefore, on 26 March 1993, the UNSC 
adopted Resolution 814 and established UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II’s mandate was to take 
appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish a secure environment 
throughout the country. UNOSOM II was to complete the task begun by the UNITAF for the 
restoration of peace, stability, law and order. By June 1993, the situation became very volatile 
and through Resolution 837 the UNSC authorised UNOSOM II to take all necessary 
measures against all those responsible for attacks against UN personnel. The operation’s 
mandate was again revised in February 1994 through Resolution 897 to monitor the situation. 
But by early March 1995 UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia. 
According to Ahmed and Green (1999: 122), the failure of the UN operation was a result of a 
contradictory multi-mandated intervention involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement. The annual expenditure of the mission was US$1.5 billion and it was the most 
expensive humanitarian operation undertaken by the UN. 
Ahmed and Green (1999: 122) viewed the intervention as: 
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The operation mandate was vague, changed frequently during the process and 
was open to myriad interpretations. The mandate changed from protecting the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance, to encouraging and maintain a secure 
environment, to capturing a leaders of one of the factions at one stage and later 
to encourage negotiations with that same leader. 
5.5.1 Current UN involvement in Somalia 
In April 1995, the UN Secretary-General established the UN Political Office for Somalia 
(UNPOS) to advance peace and reconciliation in Somalia. UNPOS is a special political 
mission that closely monitors the situation in Somalia. The head of the office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) provide periodic briefings and written 
reports to the Secretary-General and Security Council. UNPOS support various initiatives 
that promote peace and national reconciliation in Somalia (UNPOS, 2013). 
The UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) is a field support operation, which was 
authorised by Resolution 1863 (paragraph 9: 2009). Resolution 1863, noted that the AU 
called on interim stabilisation force in anticipation of a UN peacekeeping operation in 
Somalia in order to take over from AMISOM. However, the UN acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter requested AMISOM deployment to remain in Somalia and decided to renew 
the mission for a further six months. They were authorised to take all necessary measures to 
carry out this mandate. In the Resolution, the UN expressed its intent to establish a UN 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia but the decision was subject to further deliberations. 
However, as stated by Resolution 1910 (paragraph 9: 2010), the UN was aware of the on-
going instability in Somalia that contributed to piracy and armed robbery at sea. The UNSC 
instead decided to extend AMISOM’s mission for a year. It recalled its decision to establish a 
peacekeeping operation but noted that it would deploy a mission once the conditions of the 
Secretary-General’s April 2009 report were met. 
The conditions that the UNSC wanted to be met according to Report S/2009/210 paragraphs 
59-54 were: 
 For the UN to assist the TFG in building support for the peace process in Somalia. 
The TFG should take forward key transitional tasks including the drafting of a 
constitution; 
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 The TFG should create a security condition in which the process of building the State 
institutions can take root, humanitarian aid is provided safely and recovery projects 
can progress. For this a legitimate locally owned and developed national security 
apparatus is needed. 
 The strategic objective of the UN should be to help Somalia to move beyond the 
current emergency and ensure that its people experience some benefit from the peace 
process in the form of aces to basic services, livelihood support and opportunities. 
The report further states that all the activities should not be externally imposed but should be 
owned by Somalia. Conditions for the deployment would also be dependent on a secure 
country. The deployment would follow a three-track approach. First, support AMISOM to 
ensure security. Once security is achieved the second track would be providing assistance in 
the planning and deployment of the African Mission. These two steps would be considered as 
transitional steps to implement the support package to AMISOM. The second track would be 
assessed three or four months after the commencement of its implementation, at which time 
the UNSC would review the UN’s role and then decide whether the conditions and timing are 
conducive for a shift to the final phase which would be a UN peacekeeping operation.    
The conditions were not met by September 2010 and the UNSC, through Resolution 1964 
(paragraph 1: 2010), extended AMISOM’s mission mandate till 30 September 2011. The 
resolution increased AMISOM’s force strength from 8 000 troops to a maximum of 12 000. 
The UNSC still reiterated that the UN peacekeeping was dependent on the April 2009 Report. 
Resolution 2010 (2011) extended AMISOM’s mandate to remain deployed in Somalia till 31 
October 2012. The UN insisted that the AU would be supported in terms of technical and 
expert advice in planning and deploying AMISOM through UNPOS. The UN also decided 
that due to the unique character of the mission it would extend logistical support packages for 
AMISOM for a maximum of 12 000 troops. 
Through Resolution 2073 (paragraph 1:2012), UNSC decided to extend AMISOM’s 
deployment till 7 March 2013. AMISOM would maintain its presence in the four sectors in 
coordination with the NSF. The UN expanded its logistical support package for AMISOM to 
include reimbursement of certain contingent armed equipment including force enablers and 
multipliers. Through Resolution 2124 (paragraph 1: 2013) the UN decided that AMISOM 
would remain deployed in Somalia till 31 October 2014. The resolution stated that the 
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conditions in Somalia were not yet appropriate for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
operation. 
 5.6 Conclusion 
The conflict in Somalia is complex. It has  evolved to such an extent that there is a terrorist 
component in the situation. The conflict also has regional complications that spill over to 
neighbouring countries and ignites the fears of the international community. The 
peacekeeping process in Somalia has a regional actor that has to enforce and ensure peace, 
which stretch the limited resources that the AU has. After the failure of the UN missions in 
the early 1990s, the UN has made it clear that a peacekeeping mission from the institution 
would be dependent on a secure environment. The following section will discuss what 
conditions determine how a peacekeeping mission transforms into a local peacekeeping 
mission, then to a regional and thereafter a global mission.     
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SECTION SIX: Main findings and conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous sections provided background information to explain the peacekeeping 
operations of the two case studies. This section will draw together the main findings from 
Burundi and Somalia to answer the questions that were presented in Section One. The study 
investigated the conditions that explain the multiple transformations of actors in a 
peacekeeping mission. This will be discussed as well as the sub questions: what actor 
constellations are found, how the mandates are changing and how the evolution of the 
conflict impact on the actors’ capabilities? 
6.2 Conditions needed for a peacekeeping 
In the context of peacekeeping operations, each actor prefers for political reasons to gain 
greater control of the warring factions and help establish democratic institutions. Hence the 
actors have to please both domestic constituents and member states and achieve a peaceful 
settlement. As a consequence, a cooperative solution must be taken. An actor at various 
stages of the transformation has to rely on a third party to induce or enforce the peace 
agreements or be lured into a long-term interaction between the other actors in the operation. 
The main goal of the UN is to foster cooperation among the regional and at times local actors. 
From the study four conditions determine an actor’s involvement in a peacekeeping mission.  
6.2.1 The changing nature of the conflict  
H1:  An increase in the escalation of violence during the conflict decreases the probability of 
a peacekeeping transformation by not giving actors an incentive to form a mission  
The first condition looks at the changing nature of the conflict. It relates to whether violence 
and insecurity within the conflict escalates or ceases. In Burundi, the civil war was a power 
struggles among political elites. The elites used ethnicity to garner support for their political 
ambitions. Throughout the conflict power dynamics shifted between the Hutu’s and the 
Tutsi’s. The cause for the conflict was a power struggle between the two groups and the 
distribution of the country’s resources. 
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South Africa as the local peace actor entered the conflict in order to ensure that the warring 
elites found an amicable peace settlement, and ensured security for the elites. Once this was 
achieved in Burundi and disarmament was taking place, the AU deployed troops to ensure 
security in Burundi. The AU further strengthened South Africa’s role in the country by 
ensuring that the elites were protected and paved the way for democratic elections. The UN 
therefore deployed a peacekeeping mission to Burundi because the security situation would 
only be sustained once peace was fully restored. ONUB’s mandate also provided that UN 
personnel would contribute to the completion of the electoral process without prejudice.  
In contrast, in Somalia the conflict started with the collapse of the Somali government in 
1991. The Somali conflict then changed into warfare between the different clans within the 
country. Although the people in Somalia have a shared national identity, they are divided into 
sub-cultures that have different linguistic styles and cultural norms. Therefore, the conflict 
had an ethnic component 
 The conflict then shifted to become more localised and criminals in its activities and clans 
started fighting within themselves. The capital became a battleground for the Hawiye tribe. 
Between the late 1990s and early 2000s the warfare became localised. Thereafter, the conflict 
changed again whereby the extremist group Al-Shabaab came into play. Al-Shabaab is still 
causing a condition of uncertainty in the country. 
As stated, the changing nature of the conflict determines the type of peacekeeping in the 
country. Burundi’s peace process went from a local to a regional actor and then afterwards to 
a global actor. However, Somalia only has a regional actor because the changing nature of the 
conflict exacerbates the condition of insecurity within the country, making other actors 
unwilling to become involved. According to UN Resolution 2124 paragraph nine (2013), the 
conditions in Somalia was not appropriate for a UN Peacekeeping Operation. The UN 
expects AMISOM to develop an effective and tactical approach in dealing with Al-Shabaab 
to ensure a more secure environment. 
Furthermore, the changing nature of the conflict impacts on the resources that each actor has 
to contribute to the mission. Planning on the best possible deployment and strategy for a 
secure environment can be made difficult because the conflict changes. Resources are critical 
in a deployment and can also frustrate the efforts of the peacekeepers. One reason for 
IGASOM not deploying a peacekeeping mission was because of lack of financial backing. 
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The changing nature of the conflict further frustrates efforts for effective manoeuvring of 
peacekeeping personnel on the ground.  
The changing nature of the conflict discourages the means for obtaining a peace settlement 
for the conflict. The new dynamics of the conflict can provide incentive for new combatants 
to lengthen the warfare, therefore creating an additional burden on the peacekeepers. The 
changing nature also exacerbates principal-agent problems undermining peace efforts.  
6.2.2 Peace doctrines and ideas of actors 
H2: If the actors’ ideas and doctrines of peacekeeping are in synch then a peacekeeping 
transformation will occur. 
The second condition that determines the transformation of peacekeeping is the peace ideas 
and doctrines of the actors. From the Burundi case, South Africa’s peace doctrines are based 
on African Renaissance principles. This  encouraged South Africa to take a leading role in the 
peace process. South Africa made a political and strategic appraisal of the environment in 
Burundi and decided to deploy peacekeeping troops to the country. 
South Africa success in ensuring a peaceful environment made it possible for the AU to get 
involved. The policy framework of the African Standby Force (ASF) was created to enhance 
peace and security on the continent. Member States of the AU indicated through the 
framework that they would be willing to take risks for peace and accept their responsibility 
for ensuring durable development of the continent.  
Furthermore, the document states that the conflict will guide at which level the AU would 
consider involvement. From the Burundi case, the AU deployed to share the burden cost with 
South Africa. The UN’s peace doctrine is that there should be a secure environment to keep 
the peace, thus the UN intervened. 
However, the Somali case was not so simple. IGAD at the time of deciding that a 
peacekeeping mission was essential did not have a framework in which to rapidly deploy 
troops. As far as IGAD’s doctrine goes, IGAD would rather promote dialogue between the 
belligerents. IGAD’s security architecture is based on the non-interference in the internal 
affairs of its member states. Despite the lack of a framework, IGAD was ready but unable to 
deploy IGASOM. 
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The ASF Framework (2003) states in times of emergency the speedy deployment of a 
peacekeeping mission is required. As a principle, the AU’s first initiative would be to 
approach the UN to deploy a peace operation in response to an emergency situation. If the 
UN is unresponsive, the AU will deploy an All-African peace operation, while still 
continuing to try and get a positive response for the UN. 
The UN, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, will decide what measure shall be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 41 of Chapter VII states the 
UNSC may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to 
give effect to its decisions. According to Resolution 2124, conflict conditions in Somalia 
were such that a deployment of a UN peacekeeping was not yet appropriate. It can be 
determined that the policies were not equally applied to the two case studies presented in this 
dissertation. There are many reasons for this, as in IGASOM’s case capacity limitation 
played an important reason for its lack of deployment. No single actor can do everything 
within in mission, therefore ideas that synch help with the transformation process.  
6.2.3 Interest of actors 
H3: If the hegemon within an organisation have an interest in the peace process it increases 
the probability that a peacekeeping mission transformation will occur.  
The third condition for a transformation to occur is that there has to be an  interest from the 
lead member states. Actors’ positions are shaped by domestic interest. Political will is 
important to ensuring and establishing a peacekeeping mission. South Africa’s interest played 
a vital role in sending troops to Burundi. As stated in section two, South Africa’s 
achievement as a country would be measured against the progress of the same goals for the 
rest of the continent. 
For South Africa, the Burundi conflict helped South Africa strengthen its role in terms of 
conflict resolution in Africa. The expectations of the domestic and international community’s 
also helped South Africa to play a leading role towards the conflict resolution. 
Moreover, South Africa’s Foreign Policy highlights that intra-state conflict continues to 
frustrate sustainable development because of the disruptions in economic activity and 
political instability. De Kock (2011:6) states that with peace, opportunities for socio-political 
and economic growth open up. 
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However, a study of the Somalia case demonstrates that it was the lack of political will of 
IGAD members to find a real solution to the conflict. IGAD member states interest lies in 
trying to stop other members from gaining a strategic advantage in Somalia. Ethiopia is more 
concerned with deterring Eritrea’s influence in Somalia, and Eritrea is known to support Al-
Shabaab with funding. 
Furthermore, rivalry between Somalia and its neighbours runs deep. Somalia’s instability has 
spilled over to Kenya, Ethiopia and even Djibouti. Therefore these states protect their 
domestic interest instead of regional security. Despite these challenges, IGAD tried to 
establish a peacekeeping mission.  
The interest of the regional actor, the AU, is to reinvigorate its peace and security initiatives. 
The establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council is a commitment by African leaders 
to promote a stable, secure, peaceful and developed Africa. The Council African leaders also 
demonstrated their desire to assume a greater role in the maintenance of peace and security in 
Africa, because development is linked to these principles. 
Mwanasali (2008:42) highlights this point by stating: “This body would make it possible for 
the AU, in the name of non-indifference to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in 
the event of an imminent threat to peace, security and stability.” Therefore the interest of the 
AU ensured that the AU deployed AMISOM. 
Finally for the global actor, the UN, the interest can be found in its Charter’s Preamble which 
states: “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.” The UN’s interest 
is to have a world without war and establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
obligations would be maintained. Moreover, the interest of the various actors must be aligned 
in order to resolve the conflict. 
6.2.4 Institutions in peacekeeping 
H4: If institutions are in agreement, then a peacekeeping transformation will occur.  
The last condition in determining a transformation is the institution. It is institutions that 
make operations credible and possible. Influence is reciprocal between international 
institutions. The principles, rules and institutions of a regime may have two types of effects 
on strategies. Firstly, it can create a focal point that allow for expectations to be met and 
provides guidelines for legitimate actors and for policymakers about feasible patterns of 
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agreement. Secondly, it can restrict state behaviour by prohibiting certain actions. Regimes 
have little enforcement power, and powerful states can take advantage of this and can take 
forbidden measures. However, this may damage their reputations and, in turn, their future 
arrangements (Keohane and Nye: 1987: 743). 
As an institution the AU has repeated calls for a greater degree of African autonomy. 
However, they are contradicted by the unwillingness of many African states to commit 
significant amounts of their own resources to the building of the AU peace and security 
architecture. As Williams (2011: 16) states: “Although the Peace and Security is Africa’s 
most important conflict management institution it cannot be expected to do everything.” 
Therefore, within the peacekeeping missions of the two case studies, the AU harmonised and 
coordinated the activities of the two local actors. The local actors took a leading role in 
formulating the Peace and Security Council’s response to issues within their sub-regions. 
When the UN as a peacekeeping institution is considered, its purpose is to maintain and 
ensure international peace and security; the institution takes effective collective measures for 
the prevention and removal of threats to peace. The UNSC has the primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of peace and security and, between 2004 and 2009, it had played the most 
important role in relation to conflict management and peacekeeping in Africa. 
The AU played a significant complementary role in Burundi but not so much in Somalia. 
These initiatives have helped to forge a reasonable working relationship between the UN and 
Africa’s various regional arrangements in the peace and security sector. But this also created 
tension. As Williams (2011: 17) states: “Some powerful members of the UNSC have worried 
that the interactions must not encourage the perception that the two institutions are equal 
partners in either form or substance.” 
6.3 Actor constellation in the mission 
From the above variables, the actor constellation that is/was present during a peacekeeping 
mission can be identified. In Burundi, once the warring factions signed the Arusha 
agreement, South Africa, due to its role in the getting parties to the peace table and through 
its interest and ideas of peacekeeping, deployed troops to Burundi. Within a year, the AU 
established AMIB in order for Africans to lead the peace process. Once AMIB established to 
secure Burundi, the UN deployed ONIB. And by 2006, ONIB completed its mandate and left 
Burundi. 
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The second case study is not so simple. The changing nature of the conflict in Somalia 
ensured that the arms embargo in the country could not be lifted. Therefore, despite the 
interest of IGAD to deploy IGASOM, it was unable to do so. However, the AU ensured that a 
mission was deployed in Somalia, AMISOM. But the UN’s peace doctrine would not deploy 
a mission in Somalia and instead the institution extended AMISOM’s mandate till 31 October 
2014 and remained actively seized from the conflict. 
6.4 The changing mandates of the actors 
As a peacekeeping mission passes to various actors, the mandate changes. In the Burundi 
case, South Africa had to ensure that warring factions adhered to and implemented the 
ceasefire agreement and provided protection for the political VIPs. Furthermore, South Africa 
was tasked to approach other African leaders and persuade them to provide troops for the 
deployment of a peace mission in Burundi. 
The AU’s mandate was to speed-up the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, because 
the situation, despite South Africa’s military presence, remained tense. AMIB’s mandate was 
to facilitate the activities of the joint ceasefire commission and the technical committees for 
the restructuring of the national defence and police forces; secure the assembly and 
withdrawal areas which have been identified; facilitate the supply of technical assistance for 
the DDR process; and facilitate timely the supply of humanitarian assistance. 
Establishing a secure environment for the UN to deploy ONIB’s mandate required: 
 A respect for the ceasefire agreement through the implementation and investigation of 
violations;  
 Creating a re-establishment of confidence between the Burundian forces;  
 The monitoring and provision of security at pre-disarmament assembly sites;  
 Collection of and disposal of weapons and military material;  
 The carrying out of disarmament and demobilisation portions of the national 
programme of DDR of combatants;  
 Monitoring the quartering of the Armed Forces of Burundi and their heavy weapons, 
as well as the disarmament and demobilisation of the elements that need to be 
disarmed and demobilised;  
 Monitoring the illegal flow of arms across national borders; contributed to the 
creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian 
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assistance, and facilitated the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced 
persons;  
 Contributed to the successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the 
Arusha Agreement to ensure that a secure environment for free, transparent and 
peaceful elections took place;   
 Protected civilians under limited threat of physical violence prejudicing the 
responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi; ensured the protection of 
UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as the security and 
freedom of movement of ONUBs personnel, and coordinated and conducted mine 
action activities in support of its mandate. 
In the Somalia case, AMISOM’s mandate also changed from just providing support to the 
transitional federal institutions (TFI) in their efforts towards stabilisation of the situation in 
the country and furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; facilitating the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and creating conducive conditions for the long-term stabilisation, 
reconstruction and development in Somalia.  
The mandate was extended to maintain a robust posture with the required multipliers and 
enablers in order to facilitate the recovery of areas that were still under the control of Al-
Shabaab; establish special training teams to enhance the capacity of Somalia’s national 
defence and public safety institutions; and enhance its civilian capacity to support the efforts 
of the Federal Government of Somali (FGS) to restore effective governance, promote 
reconciliatory human rights and rule of law and ensure service delivery in the recovered 
areas.  
Therefore AMISOM’s mandate developed to include a policing component as well as a 
humanitarian assistance mission. AMISOM is also a peace enforcement mission that includes 
peacekeeping and nation building. 
6.5 Capabilities of actors 
From the study it is clear that the local actors cannot alone ensure the cost of a peacekeeping 
mission. South Africa required additional troop support from Ethiopia and Tanzania. IGAD’s 
deployment was not only hampered by the arms embargo in place in Somalia, but also due to 
lack of funding, troops and technical assistance. 
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The AU mission troops come from the institutions member states, but the cost of the mission 
are often fitted by the international community. The EU is providing financial support for the 
AMISOM mission and the UN is providing technical and political support. The longer an 
actor is involved in peacekeeping missions and with changing mandates, the greater troop 
contribution is also necessary. An example of this is Somalia. The original number of troops 
deployed was 8 000 but currently there are over 17 000 AU troops deployed in Somalia. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Armed conflict has a destructive impact on a country’s infrastructure and its people. It effects 
the socio-political and economic environment within the country. The longer the conflict 
continues, the greater the destruction and therefore efforts should be taken to prevent an 
outbreak. But once conflict has broken out, the next step should be mediation and a peace 
establishing intervention that focus on the immediate and most destructive manifestation of 
the conflict.  
The purpose of this study was not to assess the success or failures of peace operations, neither 
was it focused on the strength and weaknesses of the mission, but rather what motivates and 
informs an actor to become involved in stemming the tide of intra-state violence. Two 
variables are very important for an actor to decide whether to become involved in a conflict. 
The first variable is the doctrines or ideas of peacekeeping that the actor has. The peace 
doctrines of an actor will make a transformation from one actor to another possible. 
The second important variable is the changing nature of the conflict. An armed conflict that 
continues and creates conditions of insecurity and changes in terms of its historical context 
will be more likely to prevent the transformation of actors because actors are unclear of 
guaranteeing security for their troops. 
The two intervening variables (interest of an actor and the institutions) make decisions of 
actors easier to transform a peacekeeping mission. However, the absence of the two 
important variables is less likely make a transformation possible.   
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